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Since the Middle Ages, bankruptcy laws have been concerned with
preventing and deterring fraudulent debtors, most notably debtors who willfully
fail to fully disclose all of their assets to their creditors. This concern was no
less prevalent during the passage of the first Bankruptcy Act in the United
States in 1800, which established bankruptcy fraud as a criminal offense. No
doubt, the evolution of modern American bankruptcy law has moved toward a
more liberal treatment of debtors. Significantly, so long as debtors conform to
certain behavioral norms prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code, honest, but
unfortunate debtors can expect to receive a discharge of their pre-petition
indebtedness. Notwithstanding the existing civil and criminal remedies for
committing bankruptcy fraud through a failure to disclose assets, it is suspected
that many individuals who file for bankruptcy protection attempt to improperly
shield assets from their creditors' reach. Consequently, this Article proposes a
normative framework under which a bankruptcy trustee can conduct a
warrantless search of an individual debtor's residence upon suspicion that a
debtor is attempting to commit fraud by failing to disclose assets. More
specifically, this Article argues that a bankruptcy trustee, though bound by the
Fourth Amendment, can conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's home
based upon one of three distinct theories: (1) the bankruptcy process can be
considered a "special needs" administrative search exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement; (2) the bankruptcy law system can be
equated to a "closely regulated industry" under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; and (3) debtors implicitly consent to have their homes searched
by a bankruptcy trustee as a consequence of submitting themselves to the
intrusive nature of the bankruptcy process.
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To them the fraudulent debtor was always an actuality; they knew that no
celestial city would ever descend with him absent; and so the same old thing was
required of every debtor as the price of the new privileges, namely, full
submission to the court.
Garrard Glenn, 1936'
Introduction
Since the dawn of the twentieth century, American consumer bankruptcy
law has been predicated on two foundational principles: first, providing an
individual debtor with a "fresh start" in life, free and unhampered by pre-
existing indebtedness; and second, providing the various creditor constituencies
2with an equitable distribution of the debtor's available assets. The second of
I. Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23
VA. L. REV. 373, 387 (1936).
2. See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1991) ("The essence of
our consumer bankruptcy law is the discharge. The discharge of a consumer debtor frees the debtor from
the shackles of existing debt and places him on the economic treadmill once again-to earn, consume
and borrow." (citing Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 51 (1986))); Hallinan, supra,
at 50 ("One firmly established tenet of time-worn bankruptcy lore holds, of course, that the bankruptcy
system serves two functions: the protection and payment of creditors; and the provision of shelter and a
'fresh start' to overburdened debtors." (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1974)));
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985)
("The principle advantage bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.
Unless he has violated some norm of behavior specified in the bankruptcy laws, an individual who
resorts to bankruptcy can obtain a discharge from most of his existing debts in exchange for
surrendering either his existing nonexempt assets or, more recently, a portion of his future earnings."
(citing II U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1979))); George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Fundamentals of Noidischargeability in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1997)
("Bankruptcy law is grounded upon the public policy of freeing the honest, but unfortunate, debtor from
the financial burdens of prepetition indebtedness and thereby allowing the debtor to make an
unencumbered fresh start." (citing U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123-24
(8th Cir. 1986))); see also Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 645-46 (noting that it is the "twofold purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then
to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched" (citing
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459,473 (1913))).
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these principles is entirely subverted when individual debtors fraudulently
conceal the extent of their assets available for distribution-a potentially
serious problem in the present bankruptcy law system. Accordingly, this Article
is concerned with enhancing the powers bankruptcy trustees have at their
disposal to detect and to expose such fraud. More specifically, this Article
argues that in an effort to prevent the fraudulent concealment of assets from
distribution to creditors, bankruptcy trustees should be empowered to conduct
warrantless searches of debtors' homes without running afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.
While many, if not most, individual debtors file for bankruptcy protection
with honest intentions, there is also an underside to the current American
bankruptcy system that often goes unreported and ignored in the scholarly
literature: namely, the commission of fraud by debtors who seek protection
under the Bankruptcy Code. Almost a century ago, F. Regis Noel astutely
recognized in his work, A History of the Bankruptcy Law, the existence of two
classes of debtors in society-the truly unfortunate and the fraudulent-which,
in his view, warranted "different regulations" and complicated the bankruptcy
system. 3
Indeed, bankruptcy law has been concerned with preventing and deterring
the fraudulent debtor since at least the Middle Ages.4 For example, England
promulgated the first Anglo-bankruptcy law in 1542 during the reign of King
Henry VIII,5 and its primary purpose was not the rehabilitation of debtors, but
the prevention of fraud by debtors upon their creditors.6 The subsequent
English bankruptcy statutes treated debtors as criminal felons and moral
failures.7 The harshness of these bankruptcy proceedings, and the brutal
treatment of debtors prior to the late nineteenth century in England and the
3. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 (1919).
4. 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (1926) (noting that the distinction
between an honest but unfortunate debtor and a fraudulent debtor took root in the Italian commercial
cities of the Middle Ages); cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Consumer Bankruptcy Fraud and the "Reliance on
Advice of Counsel" Argument, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11 (1995) ("Because bankruptcy debtors have the
most to lose from the smooth functioning of these laws, they have throughout history faced the
temptation to thwart the process by concealing or giving away their property.").
5. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 236. This first bankruptcy law was officially titled, "An
Act against such persons as do make bankrupts." Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995).
6. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 236. This Act specifically recounted the common
occurrence of debtors, who after "craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's
goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any
their creditors, their debts and duties, but at their wills and pleasures consume the substance obtained by
credit of other men . . . ." Bankruptcy Act 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1542) (Eng.).
7. Vern Countryman, A History ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 227 (1976)
("The bankrupt who did not honestly surrender up his property and disclose his affairs was, under this
law, to be 'adjudged a fraudulent bankrupt' and a felon."); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 199 (3d ed. 2005) ("Bankruptcy originally had a quite punitive ring. It was
at one time a crime, later a disgrace.").
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United States, are well documented.8  Not only were debtors liable for
imprisonment for debt, but a penalty of pillory "and the loss of an ear" could
also be imposed upon a debtor "who failed to show that bankruptcy was due
solely to misfortune."9 In addition to the power to punish, the English
bankruptcy statutes empowered commissioners to investigate whether debtors
were concealing assets.
The first U.S. bankruptcy law, passed in 1800,10 "had as its conceptual
origin the English bankruptcy system familiar to the Framers of the United
States Constitution."" Much like its English antecedents, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800 established bankruptcy fraud as a criminal offense at a time when jails
were overflowing with imprisoned debtors in the various states.1 2 As the
nineteenth century progressed, however, legislators in both England and the
United States began to recognize a moral distinction between fraudulent
debtors, on the one hand, and those individuals who had succumbed to financial
calamity through life's misfortunes, on the other.'3 The subsequent American
bankruptcy acts, enacted in 1841, 1867, and 1898, moved slowly but surely in
the direction of the liberal treatment of debtors. The modem Bankruptcy Code,
enacted in 1978,14 is now considered by many to be a pro-debtor statute.
To be sure, "the attitude towards and the treatment of delinquent debtors
have been subjected to significant changes since the days of torture and slavery
under the Roman law and the days of pillory and imprisonment under English
8. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); Jay Cohen, The History of
Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL
HIST. 153 (1982); Ven Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-and a Modest Proposal To
Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809 (1982); Countryman, supra note 7; Ian P.
H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1980); Rhett Frimet, The Birth of
Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160 (1991); Glenn, supra note 1; Charles Jordan Tabb,
The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991) [hereinafter
Tabb, Bankruptcy Discharge]; Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, Bankruptcy Laws]; Israel Treiman, Acts
ofBankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 189 (1938).
9. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History ofEnglish Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17
(1919).
10. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
11. Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2002); see also DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 90 (2001) ("The
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was derived from English law, as were parts of the 1841 and 1867 acts .... );
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 13 (1935) (noting that the initial
bankruptcy bill introduced in the United States closely followed the English Bankruptcy Act); Tabb,
Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 8, at 6-7 ("The first United States bankruptcy law, passed in 1800,
virtually copied the existing English law.").
12. WARREN, supra note 11, at 22; see also Countryman, supra note 7, at 228 (noting that "the
colonies and then the states had carried over the English system of imprisonment for debt and only some
of the states had insolvency laws which would give the debtor a discharge or at least a release from
jail").
13. Tabb, Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 8, at 338.
14. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
370
Vol. 28, 2011
A Delicate Balancing Act
law."15 Today, the "enlightened approach" is to afford honest but unfortunate
debtors an opportunity to free themselves from the burden of debt through the
bankruptcy discharge.'s Despite the pro-debtor focus of the current Bankruptcy
Code, however, the potential for debtors to commit fraud, "keep house,"' 7 or
otherwise conceal assets from the bankruptcy process remains a concern; the
reported cases are rife with examples of debtors attempting to hide or shield
assets from their creditors.' 8
Beginning in 1996 and continuing to the present, well over one million
individuals have filed for consumer bankruptcy protection each year.
Moreover, since 1989 through the present, more than 90% of all bankruptcy
15. Charles Seligson, Major Problems for Consideration by the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws ofthe United States, 45 AM. BANIKR. L.J. 73, 78 (1971).
16. Id.
17. The concept of "keeping house" refers to the act of a debtor who intentionally seeks refuge
in his or her home for the purpose of avoiding creditors and civil process. See Cohen, supra note 8, at
155; Frimet, supra note 8, at 163; see also Treiman, supra note 8, at 194 ("This was the notorious
practice of 'keeping house,' by which a debtor, protected by the sanctified English maxim that a man's
house is his castle, would betake himself to his home and there consume his creditors' goods, utterly
immune to forcible intrusion by legal process." (citing Israel Treiman, Escaping the Creditor in the
Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. REV. 230, 233-34 (1927))).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (convicting under the
criminal law for concealing an asset from the bankruptcy trustee); Vill. of San Jose v. McWilliams, 284
F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying debtor's discharge after attempting to transfer property prior to
commencing bankruptcy); United States v. Cluck, 143 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Thus, before
invoking the power of Title 11, he perceived that it might be useful to keep some Jaguars in reserve,
some money within easy access, and, maybe, just for good measure, a few of his favorite things beyond
the reach of his creditors and the bankruptcy court."); United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922 (8th Cir.
1995) (convicting debtor under 28 U.S.C. § 152 for concealing approximately $36,000 from the
bankruptcy proceeding); Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying debtor's
discharge for failing to disclose significant assets in the bankruptcy process); Stegeman v. United States,
425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1970) (convicted debtors of violating 18 U.S.C. § 152 after fraudulently
transferring certain assets to third parties before the institution of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding
against them); United States v. Shapiro, 101 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1939) (convicting debtor of concealing
money from the bankruptcy trustee); Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2007) (finding that debtor attempted to conceal approximately $250,000 worth of assets from the
bankruptcy proceeding); United States Tr. v. Gardner (In re Gardner), 344 B.R. 663 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2006) (denying debtor's discharge for failing to disclose his interest in a corporation); Jeffrey M.
Goldberg & Assocs. v. Holstein (In re Holstein), 299 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying debtor's
discharge for fraudulently concealing assets from the bankruptcy court); Roudebush v. Sharp (In re
Sharp), 244 B.R. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying debtor's discharge for intentionally concealing
assets from the bankruptcy court); Banc One, Tex., N.A. v. Braymer (In re Braymer), 126 B.R. 499
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (denying debtor's discharge after exhibiting a pattem of behavior to hide assets
from her creditors); United States v. Conner, 25 F. Cas. 595 (C.C.D. Mich. 1845) (indicting debtor under
criminal law for failing to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy proceeding). This list serves as an
illustration and is not exhaustive.
19. Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980-2009), AM. BANKR. INST.
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfn?Section-Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&CONTENTID=60229 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). In 2006 and 2007, however, nonbusiness
bankruptcy filings reached only 597,965 and 822,590, respectively, largely as a result of the
overwhelming number of individuals filing for bankruptcy protection prior to the effective date of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act on October 17, 2005. The shortfall in both
2006 and 2007 was made up during 2005, when over two million individuals filed for consumer
bankruptcy protection. Id.
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petitions filed in the country represent individual consumer debtors.2 0 These
figures are significant because the Department of Justice had long suggested
that fraud is committed in approximately 10% of all civil bankruptcy cases.21
Although difficult to provide any empirical data on the reach of bankruptcy
fraud, it has been estimated that bankruptcy fraud costs creditors, the federal
govemment, and local governments approximately one billion dollars a year.22
Simply using the suggested percentage provided by the Department of Justice
means that approximately one-hundred thousand separate acts of bankruptcy
fraud are committed by consumer debtors each year, amounting to about 1.5
million instances of bankruptcy fraud since 1996.23 Moreover, one empirical
study conducted a decade ago revealed disturbing results.2 4 According to the
study, debtors failed initially to disclose 38% of their collective assets
eventually administered in the Chapter 7 cases, and 41% of the cases had
undisclosed assets.25
At present, the bankruptcy laws provide two mechanisms to redress
fraudulent conduct: civil and criminal. On the civil front, if a debtor is
suspected of committing bankruptcy fraud, including concealing assets from
the bankruptcy court, the Bankruptcy Code provides two remedies. First, the
bankruptcy court or the bankruptcy trustee could seek to dismiss the
bankruptcy case;27 second, the bankruptcy trustee or one of the creditors could
20. Id. The term "consumer debtor" is used to refer to an individual who chooses to file for
bankruptcy protection under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(8) (2006). This term is consistent with the definition of "consumer debt" in the Bankruptcy Code
as any "debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose." Id.; see
also William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer
Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 403 (1994)
(noting that the most basic choice for a consumer contemplating filing for bankruptcy relief is to choose
between Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code).
21. Craig Peyton Gaumer, A Call to Arms: How Can the Department ofJustice Better Combat
Bankruptcy Crimes?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (1999).
22. Sharon Walsh, Bankruptcy Fraud Rises as Debtors Hide Assets, WASH. POST, July 13,
1991, at Al, A9.
23. On or about April 7, 2009, the U.S. Trustee Program reported that based upon its recent
audit of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, 21% of the 1276 cases audited during fiscal year
2008 contained a "material misstatement" or an indication that the audit produced information that
"challenged the accuracy, veracity, or completeness of a debtor's petition, schedules, or other filed
bankruptcy documentation." See Debtor Audits: USTP Findings, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Apr. 7, 2009,
at 6; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 469
(1997) (opining that "the number of dishonest debtors receiving discharges is substantial").
24. See Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 653 (1999) (describing the results of an empirical study performed on the initial filings in
two hundred randomly chosen consumer bankruptcy cases filed in the first half of 1998 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan); Steven W. Rhodes, A Preview of
"Demonstrating a Serious Problem with Undisclosed Assets in Chapter 7 Cases," 5 NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISOR 1 (2002) [hereinafter Rhodes, A Preview].
25. Rhodes, A Preview, supra note 24, at 1.
26. Nevin M. Gewertz, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the Bankruptcy Fraud
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 152, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 909, 912 (2009) ("Bankruptcy laws provide two means of
redress for fraudulent concealment of assets: civil and criminal.").
27. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
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attempt to object to the debtor's discharge.28 On the criminal front, if a debtor
"knowingly and fraudulently" (1) conceals assets from the bankruptcy
proceeding; (2) makes a "false oath or account" in a bankruptcy case; or (3)
makes a "false declaration" in connection with a bankruptcy case, 18 U.S.C.
§ 152 makes any one of these actions a crime punishable by fine or by
imprisonment for up to five years, or both.
The available civil and criminal remedies addressing bankruptcy fraud,
though seemingly powerful, are less effective in practice. 30 While the singular
purpose of filing for bankruptcy protection is to receive a discharge of
indebtedness, which results in the extinguishment of personal liability on the
debt, 31 a denial of a discharge leaves the debtor in no worse of a position vis-a-
vis creditors than before filing for bankruptcy protection. 32 In other words, after
a denial of discharge, the existing creditors remain empowered to collect their
debts from the debtor in personam.33 As for the remedy of criminal punishment,
it is no secret that institutional resources for prosecuting instances of
bankruptcy fraud "are limited, and resulting prosecutions of bankruptcy fraud
alone are few and far between." 34
Notwithstanding the possibility of facing both civil and criminal remedies
for committing bankruptcy fraud, "many persons who file for relief choose to
try to cheat the system."35 The potential for abuse is exacerbated because once
28. Id. § 727(c)(1).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
30. See Bankruptcy Fraud: A Roundtable Discussion, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 275, 279
(1998) (noting that actions to deprive a debtor of his or her discharge fail to deter attempts at fraud);
James M. Cain, Proving Fraud in Credit Card Dischargeability Actions: A Permanent State of Flux?,
102 COM. L.J. 233, 256 (1997) (observing that the withholding of a discharge is often an empty threat to
debtors whose lack of assets removes any fear of civil remedies); Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud
Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 891, 917 (1986) (arguing that
the penalty of nondischargeability is not an effective penalty for debtor fraud).
31. In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that a Chapter 7
discharge "voids all of the debtor's personal liability on a debt" (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991))).
32. Gewertz, supra note 26, at 912 ("Significantly, however, civil penalties impose no greater
penalty than the original debt itself. If successful in his fraudulent act, the debtor retains the value of any
concealed assets[;] if caught, the debtor remains in no worse position relative to his creditors." (citing
Zeigler, supra note 30, at 911)); see also Ralph C. McCullough, Bankruptcy Fraud: Crime Without
Punishment II, 96 COM. L.J. 257, 284 (1991) ("Demanding that a debtor restore to the estate assets he
has appropriated will help make up what has been stolen, but it leaves the debtor no worse off than he
would have been had he originally surrendered the assets. He risks nothing by attempting to hide assets
that may later be recovered.").
33. IRS v. Cousins (In re Cousins), 209 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The debtor remains
personally liable, however, for any nondischargeable debts." (citing Marvin E. Jacob & Jacqueline B.
Stuart, The Search for Balance in Bankruptcy: Congress Debates Bankruptcy Overhaul as Consumer
Bankruptcies Rise, 116 BANKING L.J. 369, 377 (1999))).
34. Gewertz, supra note 26, at 931 (citing McCullough, supra note 32, at 258); see also
Gregory E. Maggs, Consumer Bankruptcy Fraud and the "Reliance on Advice of Counsel" Argument,
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7 (1995) (noting that prosecutions for bankruptcy fraud "have been fairly rare").
35. Craig Peyton Gaumer, The Hazard of Concealing Assets in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 8, 8 (2003). Indeed, Gregory Maggs acknowledged this reality well over a decade ago:
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a bankruptcy petition is filed there is no real mechanism by which the
bankruptcy trustee or the court can positively check the accuracy of the
information provided by the debtor in the bankruptcy petition and
accompanying schedules. In other words, the present bankruptcy system is
"essentially one of self-reporting."36 As presently constituted, the Bankruptcy
Code "relies on a debtor to make a complete, full, and honest disclosure of all
required information."37 As Lynn M. LoPucki has observed, though the present
bankruptcy system mandates an investigation of every debtor's financial
affairs, it does not, and practically cannot, happen in actuality.
These deficiencies with the current consumer bankruptcy system indicate
that a bankruptcy trustee should be afforded an additional measure toward
uncovering fraudulent conduct, namely, the ability to search a debtor's home
for the concealment of assets. Notably, a distinction must be drawn between the
honest, but unfortunate, debtor, and the debtor who is "unable" or unwilling to
repay creditors as a result of resorting to fraudulent machinations. 3 9 This
Article focuses on this latter category of debtors. Such a suggested remedy,
however, "involves significant issues regarding the intersection of a bankruptcy
trustee's statutory duties under the Bankruptcy Code and the application of the
Fourth Amendment." 40
At present, only two reported decisions have squarely addressed the issue
of a bankruptcy trustee's authority to search a debtor's residence and the
concomitant need to comply with any Fourth Amendment restrictions. 4 1 Both
decisions permitted the bankruptcy trustee to search the debtors' homes, but
only after the trustee first applied to the court for a search order.42 As will be
discussed below, these decisions do not go far enough in enabling a bankruptcy
Consumer debtors frequently attempt to cheat the bankruptcy system by devising ways to hide
their property or income from the bankruptcy trustee, thereby keeping it from their creditors.
Most schemes require little imagination or cunning. Some debtors give their property to
relatives prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Others lie or fail to make a full disclosure about
what they own or earn in documents submitted in court. Whatever the technique, the debtor's
goal is always to obtain a discharge at the least possible personal cost . . .. The debtor does not
need a law degree to figure out that the bankruptcy trustee assigned to the case will not be able
to distribute to creditors any property or money that the trustee does not know about and
cannot find. Some debtors, as a result, simply lie on their bankruptcy schedules.
Maggs, supra note 34, at 3.
36. McCullough, supra note 32, at 295.
37. Yoppolo v. Sayre (In re Sayre), 321 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004); see also
United States v. McIntosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the duty to disclose assets falls upon the debtor).
38. LoPucki, supra note 23, at 476.
39. See 8 HOLDsWORTH, supra note 4, at 229 (noting that the bankruptcy laws of England in
the seventeenth century attempted to make this distinction).
40. Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353, 355 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
41. See In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 353; Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. at 403
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
42. See In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 353; In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 403.
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trustee to carry out the task of investigating the financial affairs of a consumer
debtor.
The purpose of this Article is to propose a normative framework under
which a bankruptcy trustee can conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's
residence upon suspicion that a debtor is attempting to commit fraud by failing
to disclose assets to the bankruptcy court. Part I of this Article begins with a
brief, contextualized overview of the consumer bankruptcy process. Part II then
examines whether a bankruptcy trustee is a state actor for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment and answers this question in the affirmative. Part III
discusses the two reported cases on this issue: Taunt v. Barman (In re
Barman)4 3 and Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn)." Part IV advances the
thesis of the Article, namely, that a bankruptcy trustee, though bound by the
Fourth Amendment, can conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's home based
upon the following three distinct theories: (1) that the bankruptcy process is a
"special needs" administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement; (2) that the bankruptcy law system can be equated to a
"closely regulated industry" under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; and (3)
that debtors implicitly consent to have their homes searched by a bankruptcy
trustee based upon the intrusive nature of the bankruptcy process along with the
trustee's statutory duties to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.
I. The Consumer Bankruptcy Process, the Discharge, and the Fresh Start
Individuals contemplating filing for bankruptcy protection can generally
choose to file for Chapter 7, Chapter 13, or Chapter 11. The ultimate decision
of selecting a particular chapter of the Bankruptcy Code largely depends upon
the debtor's financial status and the significance of the debtor's assets. The
scope of this Article encompasses the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy
processes because Chapter 11 filings usually come with a presumption that
individual case trustees will not be appointed to oversee and direct the
distribution of assets and the allocation of creditors' rights.4 5
By far, the most common type of bankruptcy case for individuals is a
46
liquidation proceeding governed by Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Once
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition is filed,47 the Bankruptcy Code mandates that a
43. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 403.
44. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 353.
45. See generally II U.S.C. §§ 1104-1107 (2006) (setting forth circumstances under which a
trustee may be appointed and terminated in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the duties of the trustee, and the
rights of the debtor in possession).
46. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.23 (2d ed. 2009) ("A Chapter 7
liquidation bankruptcy case is the norm. The majority of all bankruptcy filings, over 60%, are
liquidation bankruptcies under Chapter 7."); see also II U.S.C. §§ 701-784.
47. The commencement of a bankruptcy case is usually a voluntary act by the debtor.
However, the Bankruptcy Code provides for the involuntary filing of a bankruptcy petition against a
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48bankruptcy trustee be appointed to serve in the case. The primary function of
a bankruptcy trustee in a Chapter 7 proceeding 49 is to collect and liquidate
"property of the estate"50 that is otherwise not exempt from the bankruptcy
process. Subsequently, the trustee distributes any proceeds from the liquidation
to creditors in accordance with the priority scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code.s"
During the pendency of the bankruptcy case, creditors are enjoined, or
"stayed," from any attempts to collect their claims from the debtor or from the
52bankruptcy estate. In exchange for relinquishing any nonexempt assets to the
bankruptcy trustee for liquidation, the Chapter 7 debtor is permitted to retain
post-petition earnings free from the claims of the pre-bankruptcy creditors.53
The goal of a consumer debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding is to
obtain a discharge of pre-petition indebtedness, 54 which, as noted previously,
results in the extinguishment of the debtor's in personam liability for the debt.
In contrast to Chapter 7, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code "permits
individual debtors to restructure and repay debt through repayment plans and to
obtain a discharge and retain assets in consideration of paying their disposable
income to creditors under a plan which is supervised by a trustee."56 During the
course of the Chapter 13 case, the automatic stay prevents creditor collection
debtor, if certain conditions are met. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 700.02 (16th ed. 2010); see also
II U.S.C. § 303(b).
48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-702.
49. See generally id. §704 (specifying duties of the trustee).
50. Upon the filing ofa bankruptcy petition a mythical bankruptcy "estate" is created that is
comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." Id. § 541(a)(1).
51. In re Tarrant, 349 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006) ("A 'Chapter 7 trustee's duty is
to reduce to money the legal or equitable interests owned by the debtor in these various assets so that the
proceeds may be distributed to unsecured creditors in accordance with Section 726."' (citing In re
Talbert, 268 B.R. 811, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001))).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (specifying ways in which a bankruptcy filing operates as a stay of
creditor collection efforts).
53. Id. § 541(a)(6) (including in property of the estate "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an
individual debtor after the commencement of the case"); see also TABB, supra note 46, § 1.1 ("An
individual debtor thus may keep his future earnings for himself, free from the claims of his pre-
bankruptcy creditors.").
54. Edwards v. Sieger (In re Sieger), 200 B.R. 636, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) ("The goal of
all bankruptcy legislation is to achieve a just and equitable distribution of the estate to the creditors and
to relieve the honest debtor of his debts, giving him a fresh start." (quoting In re Epstein, 39 B.R. 938,
941 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984))).
55. Notably, "a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-
namely, an action against the debtor in personam-while leaving intact another-namely, an action
against the debtor in rem." Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991).
56. 2 NANCY C. DREHER & JoAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 13:1 (5th ed.
2009); see also In re McCollum, 348 B.R. 377, 393 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) ("As part of the deal a
debtor makes with his or her creditors when electing to file under chapter 13, as opposed to chapter 7,
the debtor retains all pre-petition property in exchange for committing all post-petition disposable
income to the payment of creditors under a plan of reorganization." (citing In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406,
410 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); In re Golek, 308 B.R. 322, 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004))).
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efforts while a plan of repayment is developed and thereafter approved by the
court.57 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the Chapter 13 "standing trustee"
serves as the principal administrator in the proceeding. 8 "Unlike the Chapter 7
trustee, the Chapter 13 trustee does not sell the debtor's nonexempt property.
Instead, the Chapter 13 trustee's main function is to collect a debtor's plan
payments and make payments to creditors in accordance with the Chapter 13
plan." 59 That said, however, like the Chapter 7 trustee, the Chapter 13 trustee is
also charged with the responsibility of investigating the financial affairs of the
debtor and opposing the discharge of the debtor if warranted. 0 The Chapter 13
trustee, like its Chapter 7 counterpart, has the responsibility of investigating the
debtor's financial affairs. But unlike the Chapter 7 trustee, the Chapter 13
trustee "does not take possession or liquidate property of the estate, except with
respect to money collected for the purpose of making distributions to creditors
under a plan."61
The proverbial fresh start is accomplished through the discharge of most
of the debtor's pre-petition indebtedness. 6 2 The linchpin of the consumer
discharge is that the debtor must demonstrate forthrightness and honesty
throughout the bankruptcy proceeding, including in the disclosures and
financial information provided in the bankruptcy petition and accompanying
schedules.63 Indeed, the granting of the discharge is not an absolute right but is
dependent upon the ingenuous dealings of the debtor. Accuracy, honesty, and
57. 2 DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 56, § 13:1.
58. Id. § 13:9.
59. Id.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (2006).
61. 2 DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 56, § 13:9.
62. In perhaps the most cited recitation of the fresh start principle, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.' This purpose of the act has been again
and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that it
gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which
he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)); see
also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The
bankruptcy laws embody a congressional policy to free an honest debtor from his financial burdens and
thus to allow him to make an unencumbered fresh start.").
63. See In re Slentz, 157 B.R. 418, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993) ("Since the proper operation
of the bankruptcy system depends, to a large extent, upon debtors honestly and forthrightly completing
the schedules and statements which are filed with the court, attempts at cheating cannot be made to
appear too attractive.").
64. See In re Williams, 286 F. 135 (W.D.S.C. 1921) ("The granting of a discharge is not an
absolute right, existing at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, but is dependent on the
square dealings and honest purpose of the bankrupt, as evidenced by his acts and doings after the filing
of his petition.").
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complete disclosure by the debtor are critical to the functioning of the
bankruptcy system and are "inherent in the bargain for the discharge." 65 To this
end, unless the individual debtor violates a proscribed form of behavior
contained within the Bankruptcy Code or developed through federal
bankruptcy law,66 an individual who files for bankruptcy relief can ordinarily
obtain a discharge from the majority of pre-petition debts in exchange for
surrendering any nonexempt assets. 67
The types of prohibited conduct that would lead to a denial of the
discharge can manifest in the debtor's behavior either leading up to the
bankruptcy filing or during the bankruptcy proceeding itself. For example, a
court may deny a debtor's discharge if the debtor: (1) transferred or concealed
any property from the bankruptcy process so as to defraud any creditor;68 (2)
transferred or destroyed property within one year before the filing date with the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; 69 (3) transferred or destroyed
"property of the estate" 70 after the bankruptcy petition was filed;71 (4)
concealed, destroyed, mutilated or falsified any financial documents;72 (5)
made a false oath or presented a false claim in connection with the bankruptcy
case;73 or (6) failed to obey any lawful order of the bankruptcy court.74 Quite
significantly, debtors who transgress prohibited behavioral norms, fail to
perform their duties in the bankruptcy case, or abuse the bankruptcy process
itself will be unable to discharge their pre-petition debts.75
II. Bankruptcy Trustees and State Action
Before addressing whether a bankruptcy trustee possesses the authority to
search a debtor's home, a preliminary inquiry must be made into whether a
76bankruptcy trustee is even bound by the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.
65. Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Mascolo,
505 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1974)).
66. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006) (enumerating the types of conduct warranting a
denial of the Chapter 7 discharge); id. § 1328(a) (outlining the parameters of the discharge in a Chapter
13 case).
67. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1393, 1393 (1985).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
69. Id. § 727(a)(2)(A).
70. Section 54 1(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "property of the estate" as "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." See id.
§ 541(a)(1).
71. Id. § 727(a)(2)(B).
72. Id. § 727(a)(3).
73. Id. § 727(a)(4).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A).
75. Royal Am. Oil & Gas Co. v. Szafranski (In re Szafranski), 147 BR. 976, 981 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1992).
76. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
378
Vol. 28, 2011
A Delicate Balancing Act
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment "is applicable only to governmental
activity; it does not regulate private searches and seizures."77 That is, the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable to "a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one,
effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or
with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official."78 It follows,
therefore, that if there is no governmental intrusion, the Fourth Amendment is
simply not implicated.79 A bankruptcy trustee, however, occupies a gray area
"between the extremes of overt governmental participation in a search and the
complete absence of such participation."so This situation exists because a
bankruptcy trustee possesses characteristics of both a private and a
governmental actor. As such, the determination of whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to a bankruptcy trustee is not absolutely free from doubt.
While de minimis or incidental contacts between a private party and a
governmental agency or law enforcement official will not create the necessary
nexus for constitutional purposes, if the government is "involved either directly
as a participant or indirectly as an encourager of the private citizen's actions,"81
then the private actor will be deemed to be an instrument of the state under the
Fourth Amendment. 82 In general, courts ask the following two questions prior
to deciding that a sufficiently close nexus exists to implicate the Fourth
Amendment: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to
assist law enforcement efforts or to further the party's own needs.
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, "all the
administrative aspects of bankruptcy, including the appointment of trustees,
were performed by the judiciary."84 For various reasons, including a fear that
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
77. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 4
(2008).
78. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1309
(4th Cir. 1994) ("The Fourth Amendment protects this reasonable expectation of privacy against
government intrusion. It has long been established that the security provided by the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable search and seizure applies solely to government intrusions."); United States v.
Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A wrongful search or seizure by a private party does not
violate the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Ellison, 469 F.2d 413, 415 n.2 (9th Cir. 1972)
("Where the search and seizure is by private persons not assisted by or arranged for by the police, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply.").
79. Jones, 31 F.3d at 1309.
80. Walther, 652 F.2d at 791.
81. United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010).
83. See United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1984); see also United
States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005) (adopting the same two-part inquiry);
United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 398 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Two critical factors in assessing whether a
private party acts as an agent of the government are (1) the government's knowledge of and
acquiescence in the search, and (2) the intent of the party performing the search.").
84. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.01 (16th ed. 2009).
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the bankruptcy courts would fail to appear impartial to the public and to the
participants in the process, Congress created the U.S. Trustee Program to
oversee the administration of the bankruptcy laws in the United States."s The
Department of Justice, indisputably an agency of the United States, 8 created
the U.S. Trustee Program, which is under the supervision of the U.S. Attorney
88General. The Attorney General, through the Executive Office for United
States Trustees, is charged with appointing one U.S. Trustee for each of the
twenty-one regional federal districts across the country.89 Pursuant to the
strategic plan published by the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Trustee
Program is described as a "high-performance, litigating component of the
Department of Justice with growing capacities to fulfill its mission, including
combating fraud and abuse in the bankruptcy system." 90 In turn, the twenty-one
U.S. Trustees are responsible for executing the U.S. Trustee Program, which, in
part, "acts in the public interest to promote the efficiency and to protect and
preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system."91
Each of the twenty-one U.S. Trustees who are supervised by the Attorney
General 92 (and the Office of the United States Trustee) has a statutorily
prescribed list of duties-the most significant of which for present purposes is
that each individual U.S. Trustee "shall establish, maintain, and supervise a
panel of private trustees that are eligible and available to serve as trustees" 93 in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 94 Thus, in each district the U.S. Trustee appoints a
number of individuals to serve as Chapter 7 trustees in the bankruptcy cases
that are filed in that geographical region. 95 These "panel trustees" serving in the
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (establishing the Department of Justice as an executive department
of the U.S. government).
87. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 established the U.S. Trustee Program. See Angelo v.
Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1994).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 581 (establishing the U.S. Trustees).
89. Id. § 58 1(a).
90. U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2005-2010,
available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust-org/StrategicPlanFY2005-2010.pdf; see also 28 C.F.R.
§0.1 (2010) (describing the Department of Justice as consisting of several "principal organizational
units," including the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustees).
91. U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY2011 BUDGET REQUEST (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/201 ljustiflcation/pdf/fyl I -ustp-justification.pdf.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 586(c).
93. Id. § 586(a)(1) (emphasis added).
94. Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are the most common type of bankruptcy case filed across the
country. TABB, supra note 46, § 1.1. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, otherwise known as a
"liquidation," the debtor's existing and available assets are sold and the net proceeds are distributed to
creditors in accordance with the priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
95. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 84, T 6.01[2][b] ("Cases generally are assigned to
trustees in blind rotation.").
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individual bankruptcy cases are predominantly, if not always, private parties,
usually "an attorney or accountant engaged in private practice."96
Consequently, these private attorneys and accountants serving as trustees
in each bankruptcy case would be the persons seeking authority to search a
debtor's home for potentially concealed assets. This scheme can cause
confusion for the federal courts. To be sure, the Office of the United States
Trustee considers the panel trustees to be private parties and not governmental
employees.97 Furthermore, the federal courts have held that a bankruptcy
trustee is not an officer or employee of the U.S. government. 98 At the same
time, however, once appointed, a bankruptcy trustee is under the supervision
and direction of the bankruptcy court99 and is sometimes afforded derived
judicial immunity because the trustee "is performing an integral part of the
judicial process." 00 Thus, as a result of the construction of the U.S. Trustee
Program, an individual panel trustee "possesses characteristics of the executive
branch, judicial branch, and of a private party."' 0 This amalgamation of traits
raises the ultimate issue of whether a private trustee's conduct can be
sufficiently attributed to governmental action so as to implicate a debtor's
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
The two reported decisions to confront this issue in the context of a search
of a debtor's residence, Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman)102 and Youngman v.
Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn),103 both concluded that bankruptcy trustees represent
a sufficiently close nexus to the government so as to bring their actions under
the scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment. As the In re Barman court held, while a
bankruptcy trustee is a private actor, "every aspect of a trustee's position and
function is subject to either statutory obligation or to federal executive or
judicial branch control."'a That is, a bankruptcy trustee is appointed and
supervised by an official of the Department of Justice, namely, the U.S.
96. See Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353, 365 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); see
also In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 285 B.R. 191, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) ("The trustee is an
attorney, as are most other Chapter 7 panel trustees.").
97. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 365.
98. Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1949); see also Wells v. United
States, 98 B.R. 806, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that a bankruptcy trustee is not under the control of the
United States).
99. See In re Med. Sterile Prods., 310 F. Supp. 262, 264 (D.P.R. 1970) (citing Lincoln Nat'l.
Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1933)).
100. Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Klobucher, 804 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Balser
v. Dep't of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that private trustees "were protected by
quasi-judicial immunity, because some 'acts [in bankruptcy proceedings] which taken out of context
would appear ministerial . . . are actually part of the judicial function"' (quoting Curry v. Castillo (In re
Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002))).
101. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 365.
102. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
103. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 353.
104. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 412.
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Trustee.105 In addition, the proximate government nexus is further indicated by
the fact that the Attorney General of the United States is charged with the
responsibility of prescribing "qualifications for membership on the panels" of
private trustees that are in turn established by the regional U.S. Trustees. o0
Moreover, it is the Office of the Attorney General and the Office of the
United States Trustee, a division of the Department of Justice, that dictate the
policy objectives of the U.S. Trustee Program, which every bankruptcy trustee
is bound to follow. In protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system, one of
the Department of Justice's asserted goals is to "[e]nforce compliance with
federal bankruptcy laws and take civil actions against parties who abuse the law
or seek to defraud the bankruptcy system."' 0 7 To that end, the manual for U.S.
Trustees encourages panel trustees to bring any evidence of fraud or
misconduct to the attention of the U.S. Trustee, who in turn must refer such
matters to the appropriate U.S. Attorney. 0 8
Admittedly, the U.S. Trustee does not ordinarily direct a panel trustee's
decisions in a particular Chapter 7 case. 1 9 Despite this, it is sensible to
conclude that the government is involved indirectly as a participant in the
consumer bankruptcy process, directing or sponsoring a panel trustee's actions
in a particular bankruptcy case. Thus, the conduct of a bankruptcy trustee is
sufficient state action to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Interestingly
enough, however, while a bankruptcy trustee seems to be bound by the Fourth
Amendment, and thus, the trustee's conduct amounts to that of a government
actor under the Fourth Amendment, a bankruptcy trustee does not necessarily
need to request a warrant prior to searching a debtor's home.
III. Prior Court Decisions Addressing the Intersection Between Bankruptcy
Law and the Fourth Amendment
To date, only two reported decisions have squarely addressed the question
of whether a bankruptcy trustee can conduct a search of a debtor's home and its
105. Id. (citing II U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 581, 586(a)(1), 586(a)(3), and 586(c)
(2006); and 28 C.F.R. § 58.4 (2010)); Shaltry v. United States, No. 95-15340, 1995 WL 866862, at *5
(9th Cir. June 26, 1995).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(d)(1) ("The Attorney General shall prescribe by rule qualifications
for membership on the panels established by United States trustees under paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, and qualifications for appointment under subsection (b) of this section to serve as standing
trustee in cases under chapter 12 or 13 of title I1.").
107. See U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL MANUAL FOR UNITED
STATES TRUSTEES 38-39 (1988), available at http://
www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ustorg/ustpmanual/docs/voll -1988AUG-general.pdf.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a) (2006) ("Any judge, receiver, or trustee having reasonable grounds
for believing that any violation under chapter 9 of this title or other laws of the United States relating to
insolvent debtors, receiverships or reorganization plans has been committed, or that an investigation
should be had in connection therewith, shall report to the appropriate United States attorney all the facts
and circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the offense or offenses believed to have
been committed. Where one of such officers has made such report, the others need not do so.").
109. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 84, T' 6.11.
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related intersection with the Fourth Amendment. Both decisions authorized a
search of a debtor's home, albeit only after the bankruptcy trustee obtained a
warrant from the court. 0
The first reported bankruptcy court decision to tackle directly the
intersection of bankruptcy law and the Fourth Amendment is In re Barman. I
In that case, Norman Barman filed a Chapter 7 petition;ll2 in his schedules
accompanying the bankruptcy petition, Barman listed "wearing apparel worth
$500" as his only asset." 3 However, Barman was apparently engaged in a
scheme to place personal property beyond the reach of creditors and to
purchase parcels of real property in the names of others in order to avoid
liability to his own creditors. Upon learning of this plan, the bankruptcy trustee
filed a complaint against Barman, alleging in part that he "fraudulently
transferred funds to his wife . . . for the purchases of [various] homes" and
concealed assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate.114 In addition, the trustee
sought to revoke Barman's discharge.115
Contemporaneous with the filing of the complaint, the bankruptcy trustee
filed an ex parte motion for an order authorizing the trustee to enter Barman's
home "and to inspect, inventory and appraise personal property." 6 The trustee
premised the need to request ex parte relief on the belief that "the debtor would
attempt to conceal assets at the home if given advance notice,"ll 7 based upon
"the [d]ebtor's previous violation of a bankruptcy court order . . . and his
experience in moving assets in a variety of situations."" 8 The bankruptcy court
granted the motion."9
110. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to obtain a
search warrant from a bankruptcy court is not free from doubt. See generally In re Application of Tr. in
Bankr. for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that the trustee had not "shown
that he has the authority to apply for the issuance of a search warrant"); Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-
A-Way), 300 B.R. 31 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that a bankruptcy trustee is not authorized to seek a
search warrant under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41).
111. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).





117. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 411.
118. Id. at 409.
119. Id. at 407. In particular, the trustee's application to the court provided as follows:
The Trustee's counsel was informed, on December 17, 1999 that the Debtor had a trailer at his
residence . . . that contained personal property of the Debtor and/or the Debtor's wife. This
information was provided to the Trustee by a party that is involved with post-petition business
litigation involving the Debtor and persons/entities related to the Debtor . . . . In addition to the
existence of the trailer, the Trustee was informed that according to what was witnessed at the
residence, including the condition of the house and the existence of a mobile home near the
premises, it appeared that the Debtor and his family may be moving from that residence. The
Trustee has expedited the filing of both an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and related
parties and this motion to avoid the likely irreparable harm to the bankruptcy estate in light of
the Debtor's history of flight and defiance of previous bankruptcy court orders.
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Following the subsequently authorized search, Barman attempted to
suppress the evidence obtained by the bankruptcy trustee during the search of
his home on the grounds that the search violated his rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.120 For many of the reasons
expressed in Part II of this Article, the In re Barman court first concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee has a sufficiently close nexus "to government and its power"
that makes it "necessary and appropriate to apply to the trustee the fourth
amendment limits on government power."l21 Using this conclusion as a
platform, the court then considered the nature and scope of a debtor's
expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment analysis and purposes. The
bankruptcy court observed that debtors have a "significantly reduced
expectation of privacy" in their homes.122 According to the court, this reduced
expectation of privacy "is a natural consequence of the substantial and detailed
disclosures that are inherent in the bankruptcy process." 23
Despite this conclusion, however, the bankruptcy court did not go so far
as to hold that debtors have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes
or personal property upon filing for bankruptcy relief.124 For the In re Barman
court, three considerations militated against such a finding. First, the court
noted "that unlike the written and filed disclosures that are available to the
public by law, an inspection of a debtor's home is not open to the public."l 2 5
Second, the court observed that "nothing in the Bankruptcy Code states or
implies an obligation upon a debtor to permit an inspection by a trustee without
a court order."1 26 That is, "[n]either the obligation to file written disclosures nor
the obligation to appear at the creditors' meeting relates at all to an inspection
of a debtor's residence by the trustee."1 27 Third, the court held that although the
Bankruptcy Code causes the debtor's property to be brought into the
bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the estate's interest
in the property "is quite limited, both in time and in function, and the debtor
retains a substantial practical and beneficial interest in that property even while
it is temporarily property of the estate."' 28
After determining that a bankruptcy trustee is bound by the Fourth
Amendment and that debtors in bankruptcy possess a reduced expectation of
privacy in their residences, the In re Barman court then defined the specific




122. Id. at 414.





128. Id. at 415.
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Amendment.129 Without much, if any, explication of why it chose to do so, the
In re Barman court adopted the ultimate dictate of Camara v. Municipal Court
into the bankruptcy context,130 holding that a bankruptcy trustee needs to secure
a search warrant prior to searching a debtor's home for concealed assets.' 3 ' The
court did not consider the possible constitutionality of a warrantless search.
As the In re Barman court conceded, experience "demonstrates that in
carrying out the trustee's obligations under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
may need to inspect a debtor's residence for property of the estate." 32
Significantly, and again as the court recognized, "such a need may arise when,
as here, the trustee has reason to believe that there are undisclosed assets to be
administered for the benefit of the estate."' 33 The court further observed that
bankruptcy trustees may have no way to fulfill the statutory obligation to
account for all of the property of the estate without an inspection of a debtor's
residence.134 To this end, the In re Barman court concluded that as a result of a
debtor's obligation to disclose all assets and to cooperate with the bankruptcy
trustee as a condition for receiving a discharge of indebtedness, a search of a
debtor's home may be "a crucial part of the process and therefore a matter of
substantial need." 35
Ultimately, in balancing the public need for the proper administration of
the bankruptcy process against the disruption caused to a debtor by a residence
search, the court sided with the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to search a
debtor's home, albeit after first obtaining a warrant from the court and
complying with the following procedures.136 First, the bankruptcy trustee must
file a written motion requesting an inspection order,' 37 setting forth the facts
establishing a reason to believe that there is property of the estate on the
129. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 415.
130. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant for administrative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors).
131. See In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 417. The In re Barman court held in this regard: "The
Court also concludes that a procedure for an inspection order in bankruptcy would be an ordinary part of
the judicial and administrative processes of bankruptcy. Indeed, allowing trustees to perform inspections
without a court order would be 'out of place."' Id. (quoting Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324
(1971)). But see Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-A-Way), 300 B.R. 31, 38 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (expressing
in dicta strong disagreement with the In re Barman court's interpretation of a bankruptcy court's
authority under the Fourth Amendment).
132. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 416.
133. Id. (citing In re Washington, 232 B.R. 814, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999)).
134. Id. at 417.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 418.
137. The In re Barman court called such a request an "inspection order." Id. at 411. However,
there is no appreciable difference between this and a search warrant for purposes of investigating the
constitutionality of such a procedure. Cf United States v. Kone, 591 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ("The Government's argument fails, however, because the Order, unlike a Fourth Amendment
warrant, did not necessarily issue upon a finding of probable cause. Although the Order was not labeled
a 'warrant,' 'nomenclature is not dispositive."' (quoting Milner v. Duncklee, 460 F. Supp. 2d 360, 378
(D. Conn. 2006))).
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premises to be inspected.13 Second, the trustee should ordinarily provide the
debtor with notice of the motion and the debtor should generally be offered an
opportunity to respond. 139 Third, the motion should seek to conduct the search
during regular business hours, in the debtor's presence, and without forcible
entry. "0 Fourth, the contemplated order must identify the premises to be
inspected. 14 1 Fifth, and finally, any warrant granted by the court should not
authorize the seizure of any property, only the inspection, inventory, and
appraisal of such property. 14 2
Barman argued against the use of the warrant insofar as it failed
specifically to describe the property that constituted the object of the search,
thereby analogizing the authorization to a "general warrant."l4 3 The In re
Barman court rejected this argument, stating that "such a restriction would
unduly compromise the trustee's ability to carry out his statutory obligations
and potentially reward the dishonest or sloppy debtor."'"
Although the In re Barman court did not address the ability of a
bankruptcy trustee to conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's home, the
decision is nevertheless significant to the thesis advanced here in several
respects. First, the court recognized that by filing for bankruptcy relief, debtors
experience a significantly reduced expectation ofprivacy in their homes, which
society is prepared to consider reasonable.14 5 This observation undergirds the
application of bankruptcy law to the "special needs" exception to the warrant
requirement. As will be discussed in detail in Part IV, the Supreme Court
created an exception to obtaining a warrant prior to a search by governmental
actors when "special needs," beyond those of routine law enforcement
activities, "make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."l46
Second, the In re Barman decision observed that in order to fulfill the statutory
obligation to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor, a trustee may need
to inspect a debtor's residence if there is reason to believe the debtor is hiding
138. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 418. According to the court, such a motion "must set forth
these facts in a detailed fashion so that the court can make an independent judgment" on the matter. Id.
139. Id. The court did, nonetheless, recognize the prospect for an ex parte motion. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 418-19. The court noted that "[i]f the trustee seeks to take actual possession of any
property, presumably the trustee will follow the established procedures for such a seizure, which may
involve an injunction." Id. (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(7) and 7065).
143. Id. at 418.
144. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 419. For a critique of the In re Barman decision, see A.
Mechele Dickerson, Can the "Public Interest" Justify Non-Consensual Searches of Homes in
Bankruptcy Cases?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 267 (2002); and Jennifer Taylor, Some Bargain: How
Bankruptcy Courts May Now Require a Debtor To Relinquish Expectations of Privacy as a Condition of
the Bankruptcy Bargain, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (2004).
145. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
146. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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assets from the bankruptcy process.147 Thus, the argument that a bankruptcy
trustee should be authorized to search a debtor's home should not appear
outlandish. Indeed, if the findings of the aforementioned empirical study that
41% of filed bankruptcy cases involve debtors attempting to conceal assets
from the bankruptcy process are accurate and can be extrapolated to reflect
national bankruptcy filings, then the need for a bankruptcy trustee to search a
debtor's home for concealed assets is a matter of serious concern. Third, the
court, in the application of its balancing test, concluded that the public interest
in full disclosure by debtors in the bankruptcy system outweighs the privacy
interests of any single debtor.148 As will be discussed in Part IV, this finding is
significant. It lends support to the argument advanced here that bankruptcy law
can be reasonably equated to a "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment. This is true insofar as the national interest in ensuring that debtors
collectively comply with the mandates of the Bankruptcy Code outweighs the
privacy interests of any individual debtor.
Approximately seven years after the In re Barman decision, another court
dealt with a similar question in Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn).149 In In
re Bursztyn, Miriam Bursztyn filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 50 On her bankruptcy petition,
Bursztyn listed as her only assets a bank account, some costume jewelry,
nominal household goods and clothing, a claim against her former husband,
and two used luxury vehicles.s Significantly, the debtor answered "none" on
the inquiry as to whether she owned any pictures or other objects of art.152
Furthermore, on her "Statement of Financial Affairs," 5 3 Bursztyn answered
''none" to a series of questions asking whether she had parted with any personal
property, either voluntarily or involuntarily, during the period of time preceding
the filing of her bankruptcy petition.1 5 4
During the course of the bankruptcy trustee's investigation into
Bursztyn's financial affairs, the trustee obtained two written judicial decisions
rendered in the debtor's ongoing state court divorce proceedings that belied the
disclosures that she made on her bankruptcy petition and accompanying
147. See id. at 416.
148. See id. at 417-18.
149. Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
150. Id. at 355.
151. Id. at 356.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 356. As part of the bankruptcy petition, all consumer debtors are required to
complete a "statement of the debtor's financial affairs," which provides a summary of the debtor's
financial history, transactions, and operations over certain periods of time before the commencement of
the case. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); see FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.
154. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 356. As all consumer debtors must, Bursztyn certified the
responses and representations made in her bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules under
penalty of perjury. Id.
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schedules.'ss Apparently over the course of their marriage, the Bursztyns
acquired a significant art collection comprised of lithographs, photographs and
original paintings.' 56 Moreover, the debtor's former husband had also given her
many pieces of fine jewelry. 57 During her matrimonial trial, Bursztyn claimed
to be no longer in possession of any artwork or jewelry. 158 Both the state trial
court and state appellate court, however, found Bursztyn to lack credibility on
the issue. Using the developed factual record, both courts believed that
Bursztyn remained in possession of the jewelry and artwork.159
Based upon these investigative findings, the trustee applied ex parte to the
bankruptcy court for an order authorizing entry into Bursztyn's residence "with
the assistance of the U.S. Marshals Service, her counsel, and an appraiser to
search for, seize, and appraise estate property located within the residence."6 o
After evaluating the trustee's request, the bankruptcy court entered an order
permitting the bankruptcy trustee, her counsel, an appraiser, and representatives
of the U.S. Marshals Service to enter Bursztyn's residence during normal
business hours to search for, seize, and appraise the uncovered assets, namely,
artwork and jewelry.61 The trustee subsequently uncovered $243,000 worth of
fine jewelry and artwork located in various places in the home; the jewelry and
artwork were found in laundry bags and suitcases tucked away in the bottom of
Bursztyn's bedroom closet.162 The appraiser's report encompassed eighteen
pages; in all, the search uncovered 189 pieces of fine jewelry and 10 works of
art.' Understandably, Bursztyn thereafter filed an opposition to the
bankruptcy trustee's actions, but the court concluded that the bankruptcy
trustee's search of her residence was reasonable under the circumstances, and
thus, constitutional.16
Although the analysis in In re Bursztyn largely reflected the conclusions
reached by the In re Barman court, the In re Bursztyn decision is important in
two very significant ways. First, the bankruptcy court explicitly adopted the
balancing test created by the U.S. Supreme Court in dealing with civil
administrative searches.16 5 In determining whether a warrantless civil
administrative search comports with the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, courts are instructed to balance the nature of the intrusion
155. Id. at 356-57. The second of these state court matrimonial decisions was issued only three
months before Bursztyn filed her bankruptcy petition. Id.
156. Id. at 357.
157. Id. at 357-58.
158. Id. at 358.
159. Id. Indeed, both state courts believed that Bursztyn was intentionally lying regarding the
whereabouts of the jewelry and artwork. Id.
160. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 360.
161. Id. at 360-61.
162. Id. at 361-62.
163. Id. at 362.
164. Id. at 373-74.
165. Id. at 369-70.
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upon the privacy interests of the individuals subject to the search against the
need for the government to conduct the search.166 Second, the bankruptcy court
observed that incursions on the protections granted by the Fourth Amendment
can be authorized to address special circumstances, implicitly concluding that
bankruptcy is, in fact, one such special circumstance.16 7
Both the In re Barman and In re Bursztyn decisions aptly noted that "a
bankruptcy trustee may need to inspect a debtor's residence for potentially
undisclosed assets" of the estate that can be administered for the benefit of
creditors.168 Indeed, as both decisions recognize, "a trustee may have no
alternative in carrying out his or her statutory obligations to marshal and
account for all of the property of the estate without an inspection of the debtor's
residence."l69 Thus, the necessity for such a remedy has already been
acknowledged; the remaining inquiry concerns what standard should govern
such conduct. As Part IV of this Article argues, bankruptcy trustees have the
ability to conduct warrantless searches of debtors' homes while still complying
with the Fourth Amendment under any one of three alternate theories: (1)
bankruptcy law as a "special needs" exception; (2) the bankruptcy system as a
"closely regulated industry"; and (3) implied consent.
While In re Barman and In re Bursztyn demonstrate that a bankruptcy
trustee can obtain a warrant to search a debtor's home, several factors weigh in
favor of a warrantless search standard in the bankruptcy context. First, the
bankruptcy courts are not in concert on the issue of whether a bankruptcy
trustee possesses the requisite authority to obtain a search warrant.170 Second, if
the concealment of assets and debtor fraud is, in fact, a systemic problem
plaguing the bankruptcy law system, then an unannounced warrantless search is
needed in cases where personal assets are easily moved or hidden. Third, if
there is cause to believe that a particular debtor is hiding assets, then any
advance notice to the debtor of a trustee's efforts to secure a warrant would
possibly defeat the purpose of the search. In other words, the assets would
simply "disappear." Fourth, and similarly, the delay inherent in obtaining a
warrant would not promote the need for a bankruptcy trustee to act swiftly
before any dissipation of assets. For example, in In re Bursztyn, almost a week
elapsed between the initial application for a search order by the trustee and its
issuance by the bankruptcy court. Such delays would frustrate the trustee's
166. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 2004).
167. In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 369 (specifying that "the circumstances of this case present
such a special circumstance").
168. Id. at 372 (citing Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 416 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2000)).
169. Id. (citing In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 416-17).
170. Compare In re Application of Tr. in Bankr. for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341, 342
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that because a bankruptcy trustee is neither a federal law enforcement office
nor an attorney for the government, a trustee "has no authority to apply for issuance of a search
warrant"), with In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 417 (holding that the issuance of a bankruptcy search and
inspection order is "an ordinary part of the judicial and administrative processes of bankruptcy").
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ability to investigate fully the debtor's financial affairs. Fifth, and finally, the
capacity of a trustee to conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's home would
deter any fraudulent conduct by future debtors who voluntarily seek bankruptcy
relief but would otherwise intentionally fail to comply with their mandated
statutory duties under the Bankruptcy Code.
IV. The Capacity of a Bankruptcy Trustee To Conduct a Warrantless Search
of a Debtor's Home
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Despite the seeming simplicity of this general tenet, the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this issue has been described in
the scholarly literature as "an embarrassment,"' 72 a "doctrinal incoherence,"n73
"the Supreme Court's tarbaby,"1 74 and an utter "mess."l 7 5
But despite the differences of opinion regarding modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine, several observations can be made with relative
assurance. First, the indiscriminate and unjustified searches and seizures carried
out by British officials under the authority of the writs of assistance "were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment."' 7 6 Second, particularly because the execution of the writs of
assistance enabled British officials to search an individual's home without
restraint, the concern for privacy in the home has been described as "the root of
171. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
172. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1993).
173. Samuel C. Rickless, The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 261, 261 (2004).
174. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468
(1984).
175. David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding
Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47,47 (2005).
176. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482 (1976) ("The Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general
warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the colonies . . . ."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 641 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring) ("While the Framers of the Constitution had their attention
drawn, no doubt, to the abuses of this power of searching private houses and seizing private papers, as
practiced in England, it is obvious that they only intended to restrain the abuse, while they did not
abolish the power."). For a detailed historical account of the writs of assistance and the resistance thereto
by the American colonists, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 172, at 757; Thomas K.
Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977 (2004);
Geoffrey G. Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly What the Framers Were
Trying To Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215 (1995); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the
Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002)
[hereinafter Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie]; Tracey Maclin, The Complexity ofthe Fourth Amendment:
A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REv. 925 (1997); and David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding
of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004).
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the Fourth Amendment itself."177 Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized a special privacy protection for intrusions into the home.178 The
Court, in Payton v. New York, expressed this sentiment in unmistakable terms:
"The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home."1 79
Third, the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment "is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.,,180 To that end,
in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unwarranted
intrusions, an individual must satisfy the two-part test enunciated by Justice
Harlan in Katz v. United States 1a: (1) the individual must exhibit an actual
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation of privacy must be
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.182 Fourth, a condition
precedent for constitutional scrutiny is the occurrence of a government-initiated
"search" or "seizure." Under the Fourth Amendment, a "search" occurs "when
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed." Further, a "seizure" of property occurs for Fourth Amendment
purposes "when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." 18 Fifth, the Fourth Amendment applies
in both the criminal and civil contexts. 85
177. Craig M. Bradley, "Knock and Talk" and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099,
1101 (2009). As Maclin explains:
Protecting the security of private homes was certainly a priority for the Framers. Indeed, one
could say that the Framers were particularly sensitive about safeguarding private homes from
governmental intrusion, as the constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and seizure
"arose from the harsh experience of householders having their doors hammered open by
magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment is
explainable only by the history and memory of such abuse." The intrusions that the colonists
experienced at the hands of British customs officers "had done violence to the ancient maxim
that "A man's house is his castle.""
Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 176, at 933 (citations omitted).
178. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 884 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 571 (1961) ("The Fourth
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.").
180. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
181. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Because defining government entry
into the home as a search is so conventional, this Article presumes that such conduct by a bankruptcy
trustee would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Marisa Antos-Fallon, The Fourth
Amendment and Immigration Enforcement in the Home: Can ICE Target the Utmost Sphere of
Privacy?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1016 (2008) ("Indeed, defining government entry into the home
as a search is so commonplace that it is not frequently discussed in judicial opinions.").
184. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
185. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992).
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This is where the consensus regarding the Fourth Amendment ends. The
Amendment itself is regarded as containing two distinct clauses: one addressing
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the other requiring the issuance of a
warrant upon probable cause. Over the past century, scholars and judges
debated the relationship between these two clauses.18 7  "The relationship
between these two clauses is murky at best and has been the topic of much
controversy in the two-hundred-plus years since their drafting."
Despite this controversy, the Court has in fact been steadfast in its
application of the Fourth Amendment to the home. Indeed, the Court has
repeated the principle that, "[w]ith few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no."' 89 Because a bankruptcy case is a civil proceeding, many of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances or a
search incident to a lawful arrest, obviously do not apply. That said, there are at
least three distinct theories by which a bankruptcy trustee need not comply with
the warrant requirement prior to conducting a search of a debtor's home: (1) the
186. Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 83, 88 (2004). The text of the Fourth Amendment provides as
follows regarding the unreasonable search clause: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Further, the Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides as follows: "[N]o
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
187. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 202 (1993).
188. Kamin, supra note 186, at 88. Tracey Maclin describes the essence of the controversy in
the following terms:
One side of the debate argues that the clauses of the amendment are independent declarations.
The first clause, the Reasonableness Clause, merely guarantees a freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The second clause, the Warrant Clause, merely specifies the form and
content of search and arrest warrants. Accordingly, the proponents of a rational basis model
contend that the Fourth Amendment does not always require that police intrusions be
authorized by a judicial warrant . . . . The other side of the debate favors the "warrant
preference" rule. Initially led by Justice Frankfurter, this side contends that the Warrant Clause
modifies the first clause-a reasonable search depends upon the authorization of a valid
warrant. While not an absolutist view, this position held that a warrant was a necessary
precondition of a reasonable search, unless there was a compelling reason for proceeding
without one.
Maclin, supra note 187, at 202-04; see also Clancy, supra note 176, at 993 ("The warrant preference
model construes the Reasonableness Clause as being defined by the Warrant Clause; that is, a search is
not 'unreasonable,' and therefore not forbidden, when it is carried out under the safeguards specified by
the Warrant Clause.").
189. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981) ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances or consent, an entry into a private dwelling
to conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a warrant."); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 587 (1980) ("It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971))).
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"special needs" administrative search exception; (2) the "closely regulated
industry" search exception; and (3) implied consent.
A. Bankruptcy as a "Special Needs" Administrative Search Exception to the
Warrant Requirement
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
was called upon to determine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in the
civil context. The Court first considered 9 o the application of the Fourth
Amendment to civil searches in Frank v. Maryland.191 In the decision, the
Court addressed the issue of whether a homeowner's conviction pursuant to a
Baltimore City Code for resisting a warrantless inspection of her home to
uncover possible rodent infestation violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.192 The Court upheld the warrantless search, emphasizing in its
holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion
where the purpose is for eventual criminal prosecution. 93 In light of the long
history of health ordinances and of the modern needs to conduct inspections,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to an administrative
search.194
The holding in Frank, however, was short-lived. In the companion cases
Camara v. Municipal Court'95 and See v. City of Seattle,196 the Court
articulated a preference for obtaining a warrant as a condition precedent to
searching both residential dwellings and commercial premises, respectively.
Since the issuance of the Camara and See decisions in 1967, the administrative
search cases under the Fourth Amendment have applied to a variety of different
contexts, including, but not limited to: commercial property;197 inspections for
housing code violations;' 98  so-called "closely regulated industries"; 1 9 9
190. Robert M. Keenan, Shoemaker v. Handel and Urinalysis Drug Testing: Looking for an
American Standard, 21 GA. L. REV. 467, 472 (1986).
191. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
192. Frank, 359 U.S. at 361-62.
193. Id. at 365 ("Certainly it is not necessary to accept any particular theory of the
interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to realize what history makes plain, that it was on
the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for
forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought." (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886))).
194. Id. at 373.
195. Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.
196. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
197. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (electrical and plumbing installation
business); See, 387 U.S. at 541 (commercial warehouse); McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance Co., 842 F.2d 724
(4th Cir. 1988) (operating plant); United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Colo. 2005)
(chrome plating manufacturer).
198. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 523 (violation of San Francisco housing code); Freeman v. City
of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2001) (violation of the City of Dallas housing code).
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inspections under the New York's Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program;200 investigations for possible arson;201 searches of children in public
schools;202 searches of state and federal governmental employees;203 searches
of probationers and parolees;204 drug and alcohol testing of railroad
employees;205 and hospital patients.206 Although the permutations of the
possible types of administrative searches are myriad, what is absent is any
application of the administrative search doctrine, and in particular its "special
needs" strain, to the bankruptcy law context.
The earliest Supreme Court administrative search cases undeniably
expressed a preference for complying with the Warrant Clause, thereby
20requiring a warrant prior to undertaking an administrative search.207 Shortly
thereafter, however, "the Court developed the administrative search doctrine, in
which it assessed the constitutionality of civil searches of commercial premises
solely under the Reasonableness Clause." 208 In its modern iteration, the Court
has "resolved the debate concerning the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment's two clauses in favor of limiting the Warrant Clause's application
to criminal searches, while resolving the constitutionality of all civil searches
solely under the Reasonableness Clause." 209 From a jurisprudential perspective,
within the framework of its administrative search doctrine, the Supreme Court
fashioned its "special needs" principle "as civil search litigation less often
199. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyard); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining facility); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms
dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor licensee); United States
v. Parker, 587 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (commercial trucking weigh station); Club Retro, L.L.C. v.
Hilton, 568 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (nightclub); United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130 (1st Cir.
2004) (commercial trucking); Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (harness racing
facility); 5 Borough Pawn, L.L.C. v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(pawnshop).
200. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
201. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
202. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Wallace v. Batavia
Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995).
203. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
204. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2009);
United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302 (11 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d
Cir. 2004); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254
(2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Kone, 591 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); State v. Turner, 297
S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009).
205. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1988).
206. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000).
207. Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in
the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223, 1227 (2004) ("Initially, the Supreme Court
indicated that, as with criminal searches, it would judge the constitutionality of civil searches of
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involved commercial premises and increasingly involved challenges to more
personalized searches." 210
Unlike its criminal law counterpart, the Supreme Court's administrative
search jurisprudence in civil cases has proven relatively stable over the past
several decades. 211 Starting with the Camara decision, the Court has clearly
differentiated between searches undertaken in the criminal context from the
civil context. Most notably, the Camara Court recognized that "probable
cause"212 as a preliminary showing prior to the issuance of a warrant would
213
simply prove unworkable in the administrative setting. Consequently, in
concluding that reasonableness is the ultimate standard regarding the
constitutionality of a civil search, the Court in Camara first articulated what is
now the generally accepted test for reasonableness in the civil context: a
balancing of the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.214
Commencing with New Jersey v. T.L.O.,215 the Supreme Court has
asserted under its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that "departures from the
warrant and individualized suspicion models are justified where the intrusion
serves a 'special need' that is 'divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement."' 216 The nomenclature "special need" was first articulated by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in TL.O. He explained: "Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that
of the Framers." 217 But as Thomas K. Clancy has observed, the term "special
need" is misleading. According to Clancy, the Supreme Court does not refer to
"any 'need' in the sense of necessity; rather, it speaks of a special interest,"218
meaning interests of a governmental purpose other than criminal law
enforcement.219
210. Id. at 1228.
211. But see Hemphill, supra note 176, at 247 (arguing that the "[t]he administrative search
doctrine has proven to be a major battleground in the war between the clauses").
212. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism. Community Caretaking, Assistance
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1485, 1498-99 (2009) ("In
the law enforcement context, the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause requirement generally sets the
balance between the public interest in the potential discovery of crime, evidence, or a suspect against the
privacy interests that would be sacrificed by the intrusion.").
213. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) ("Where considerations of health and
safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection
are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has
been undertaken.").
214. Id. at 537.
215. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
216. CLANCY, supra note 77, § 11.3.4.4.2.2.
217. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
218. CLANCY, supra note 77, § 11.3.4.4.2.2.
219. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 325 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Blackmun qualified the special needs cases as the
exceptional circumstances, the application of the doctrine has proliferated in
the twenty-five years following the TL.O. decision. 220 During this time, the
special needs exception to the warrant requirement has been adopted in a
variety of contexts, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) a search of a
public school student; 22 1 (2) a public employer's search of a public employee's
office; 22 2 (3) a search of a probationer or parolee's home;223 and (4) drug
testing of railroad employees, state civil service employees, U.S. Customs
Service employees, and high school students engaged in extracurricular
activities.224
Following T.L.O., in the companion cases of National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab 225 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association,226 the Supreme Court continued the development of the special
needs doctrine by initially reaffirming "the longstanding principle that neither a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized
suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every
circumstance."227 The reasonableness of a particular search depends ultimately
"'on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature
of the search or seizure itself."' 228 Consequently, to test the constitutionality of
a search under the Reasonableness Clause, where a governmental intrusion
serves special needs beyond the normal need for crime detection, a court will
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the government's interests
in conducting the search or seizure.229
220. For a critique of this expansion of the special needs doctrine, see Jennifer Y. Buffaloe,
"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised To Swallow the Warrant Preference
Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 529 (1997); and Ronald F. Wright, The Civil and Criminal
Methodologies ofthe Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127 (1983).
221. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
222. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th
Cir. 2000).
223. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
224. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (high school
students engaged in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(same); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (U.S. Customs Service
employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (railroad employyes); Int'l Union
v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004) (state civil service employees). But see Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305 (1997) (declining to extend the special needs exception to the mandatory drug testing of
applicants for high state office in Georgia due to the failure of the state to demonstrate a drug problem
among the state's elected officials, who do not perform "high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks").
225. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
226. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
227. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618).
228. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
537 (1985)).
229. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300
(1999) ("[W]e must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.").
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The context in which the Court has chosen to use the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement bears a direct connection in its
applicability to the bankruptcy law system.230 A survey of the special needs
cases evidences its use when (1) an individual is compelled to take some action,
such as public school students who are required to attend schools;231 (2) there is
a need for safety to protect the general public from hazardous conditions;232 or
(3) the individual voluntarily accepts some status, condition, or benefit from the
233
government2. It is this third special needs application, the voluntary nature of
some status, condition, or benefit, which has the closest correlation to the
bankruptcy law process. More precisely, it is the special needs cases involving
234
probationers or parolees that exhibit the most analogous circumstances to
consumer debtors in the bankruptcy law system.
The first Supreme Court decision to apply the special needs doctrine to
probationers or parolees was Griffin v. Wisconsin.2 35 In Griffin, Joseph Griffin,
who was on probation after conviction for a felony, had his home searched by
probation officers acting without a warrant. 236 After the officers conducted the
warrantless search of his home and discovered a handgun, a violation of the
terms of his probation, Griffin attempted to suppress the evidence seized during
237the search. In upholding the warrantless search, the Court held that a state's
operation of a probation system is a special need beyond normal law
enforcement, and probationers, even in their homes, "do not enjoy 'the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty
properly dependent on [the] observance of special [probation] restrictions." 238
In other words, the special need of supervising probationers permitted "a
230. Dimino, supra note 212, at 1522 ("Thus in special-needs cases it is typically the context
of the search, and not its object, that earns it the appellation."); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 314 (1997) ("When . . . 'special needs'-concerns other than crime detection-are alleged in
justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry,
examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties.").
231. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch.
Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995).
232. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
233. See sources cited supra noted 204.
234. Although used interchangeably herein, differences exist between parole and probation.
Parole "is the conditional release of a convict before the expiration of his term, to remain subject, during
the remainder thereof, to supervision by the public authority and to return to imprisonment on violation
of the condition of the parole." Beavers v. State, 666 So. 2d 868, 870 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting
67A C.J.S. Pardon and Parole § 39 (1978)). By contrast, probation "ordinarily refers to judicial action
taken prior" to the prison door being closed on the defendant. Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review v. Hancock,
620 A.2d 917, 926 (Md. 1993) (quoting State v. Hewett, 154 S.E.2d 476, 479 (N.C. 1967)).
235. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
236. Id. at 870. Under Wisconsin statutory law, probationers are subject to conditions set by
the court and regulations established by the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services. Id.
One of the Department's regulations permits any probation officer to search a probationer's home
without a warrant as long as there are "reasonable grounds" to believe the probationer is in possession of
any contraband or weapons and his supervisor approves. Id. at 870-71.
237. Id. at 871-72.
238. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied
to the public at large." 239
Additionally, other factors militating in favor of foregoing the warrant
requirement include the delay in obtaining the warrant, thereby making it more
difficult for probation officers "to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct,"
and the associated reduction in the "deterrent effect that the possibility of
expeditious searches would otherwise create." 240 In its next case involving
probationers, United States v. Knights,241 the Court supplemented this special
needs doctrine. In upholding the warrantless search of a probationer's
apartment, the Court balanced the competing interests in favor of the
government, concluding that a "reasonable suspicion" on behalf of the
government is all that is needed to justify the search.242
In its last special needs case regarding probationers or parolees, Samson v.
243California, the Court addressed an issue left unresolved by Knights:
"[W]hether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released
prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search" would
pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.244 Based predominantly upon the California
Penal Code and the state's parolee supervisory system, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment permits a suspicionless search of a parolee.245 For purposes
of analogizing the probation or parole special needs doctrine to the status of
consumer debtors, Samson is distinguishable from Knights and Griffin in two
very important respects.
First, the search in Samson did not occur in the parolee's home, but rather
on a public street. 24 6 Second, and as Justice Stevens' dissent makes plain,
"neither Knights nor Griffin supports a regime of suspicionless searches,
conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion untethered by any
procedural safeguards, by law enforcement personnel who have no special
interest in the welfare of the parolee or probationer." 2 47 Importantly, and
particularly because a bankruptcy trustee's intrusion on privacy would occur in
the home, the special needs exception for bankruptcy law advocated herein
would require an element of individualized suspicion of the debtor prior to any
239. Id. at 875.
240. Id. at 876.
241. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
242. Id. at 121 ("When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a
search condition is engaged in criminal conduct, there is enough likelihood that criminal activity is
occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is
reasonable.").
243. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
244. Id. at 847. A suspicionless search is one undertaken without any "level of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing." 68 Am. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 4 (2010).
245. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
246. Id. at 846.
247. Id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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search. Nonetheless, Samson is useful to the analogy between probationers or
parolees and consumer debtors.
Although analogizing consumer debtors to parolees and probationers may
appear at first blush distasteful to many, the purpose of the exercise is not to
impugn the character of consumer debtors as a group, but rather to demonstrate
a similarity of circumstances. This comparison is helpful in leading to the
conclusion that the creation of a new special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment for bankruptcy law is not shocking, but rational.
First, while the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact a
uniform, national bankruptcy law,248 an individual does not have a
constitutional right to file for bankruptcy protection. 249 More particularly,
federal courts have routinely noted that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a right,
but a privilege bestowed upon deserving debtors pursuant to federal statutory
law.250 This privilege is exercised by the bankruptcy court "only so long as the
judicial process which provides it is not abused." 25  Moreover, and quite
significantly, in the overwhelming majority of cases,252 a consumer debtor
voluntarily seeks relief under the Bankruptcy Code. 2 53 Similarly, "by accepting
the privilege of parole a prisoner consents to the broad supervisory and
visitatorial powers which his parole officer must exercise over his person and
property until the term of his sentence shall have expired or been
terminated." 254 Indeed, courts have concluded that like the filing of a
248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
249. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) ("There is no constitutional right to
obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy."); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (M.D.
Fla. 1990) (noting that "a discharge in bankruptcy is neither an inherent nor a constitutional right."); In
re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996, 1001 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("A debtor does not have a constitutional right
to receive a discharge of his bankruptcy."); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R. Griffith, Presumed
Indigent: The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Debtor's Sixth Amendment Right to Criminal Defense Counsel,
62 UMKC L. REv. 277, 301 n.128 (1993) ("While the federal bankruptcy system is a federal creation, a
person does not have a constitutional right to file bankruptcy." (citing Kras, 409 U.S. at 446)); Thomas
G. Kelch & Michael K. Slattery, The Mythology of Waivers of Bankruptcy Privileges, 31 IND. L. REV.
897, 900 (1998) ("Not only is there no constitutional right to file bankruptcy, but Congress need not
even create a bankruptcy law.").
250. See, e.g., In re Juzwiak, 89 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1996) ("It is also important, however,
to recognize that a discharge in bankruptcy is a privilege, not a right, and should only inure to the benefit
of the honest debtor."); In re McVay, 345 BR. 846, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) ("A bankruptcy
discharge is a privilege, intended to provide not only a debtor with a fresh start but to afford a debtor's
creditors an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets, twin goals which can only be fulfilled if a
debtor is completely honest."); In re Lewandowski, 325 B.R. 700, 707 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2005) ("This by
no means evidences a statutory guarantee that a debtor is automatically entitled to a discharge once the
bankruptcy process is commenced. A bankruptcy discharge is a privilege, not a constitutional right.").
251. Sicherman v. Lah (In re Lah), 88 B.R. 141, 145 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
252. WILLIAM H. BROWN, BANKRUPTCY AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS MANUAL § 2:6 (2010)
("The vast majority of bankruptcy cases are filed voluntarily by debtors, as opposed to those filed
involuntarily against them."); TABB, supra note 46, § 1.23 ("A Chapter 7 case is commenced by the
filing of a petition. The petition in almost all cases in filed by the debtor; those cases are called
'voluntary."').
253. In re Wincek, 202 BR. 161, 168 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
254. People v. Denne, 297 P.2d 451, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
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bankruptcy petition, "[r]elease on parole is a privilege and not a right." 25 5
Further, like the filing of a bankruptcy petition to obtain the discharge of debt,
the acceptance of probation or parole is a voluntary act accepted for a
256corresponding benefit, that is, release from custody. Consequently, both the
consumer debtor and the probationer voluntarily accept a benefit bestowed by
the government or the court-the discharge of one's debts and the release from
incarceration-in exchange for agreeing to be bound by certain conditions.
Second, with regard to the acceptance of conditions, consumer debtors, in
order to receive the benefit of a discharge of their pre-petition indebtedness,
must fully cooperate in the bankruptcy process by, among other things,
completely disclosing the extent of their assets. 257 To be sure, "[c]andor,
accuracy and integrity are required of a debtor in bankruptcy." 25 8 And while the
conditions imposed upon probationers and parolees can be varied and do not
necessarily hinge upon candor and integrity, the parole and probation systems
depend upon a parolee's or probationer's adherence to the conditions imposed
259
by a court, statute, or regulation. More specifically, like the denial or
revocation of the benefit of the discharge for violating some behavior norm
provided by the Code, 260 the benefit of parole or probation may be revoked for
noncompliance.261
Third, as a result of filing for bankruptcy protection, consumer debtors
have a "significantly" reduced expectation of privacy in their houses, papers
and effects "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 262 As the court
255. State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tenn. 2009); see also Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review
v. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917, 926 (Md. 1993) ("Since parole is a matter of grace and not of right, the state
may condition continuance of parole on the parolee's compliance with certain prescribed conditions.").
256. Simon v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 738, 745 (E.D. La. 1967) ("'Probation and parole
are a matter of legislative grace.' No accused is entitled to either of right." (quoting Lathem v. United
States, 259 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1958))); People v. Brown, 236 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508-09 (Ct. App.
1987) ("Contrary to the situation in Burgener, this defendant entered into a voluntary agreement
whereby he waived his right to privacy in exchange for the privilege of being released on probation.
Unlike Burgener, this defendant had every right to refuse to accept the terms and conditions of probation
proffered by the court."); In re Gonzales, 118 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (Ct. App. 1974) ("Although petitioner
accepted probation on terms fixed by the . .. court, he may challenge an invalid condition of probation
in this habeas corpus proceeding.").
257. Roudebush v. Sharp (In re Sharp), 244 B.R. 889, 891 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
258. Holder v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 126 B.R. 869, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
259. Melissa Weiss, Interpreting Searches of Pretrial Releasees Through the Lens of the
Fourth Amendment Special Needs Exception, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 363, 400 (2006) ("Releasee
compliance is essential to furthering the aims of the bail system."); cf Rizzo v. Terenzi, 619 F. Supp.
1186, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The viability of the parole system depends upon certain restrictions,
among them the ability to monitor and control travel.").
260. See generally II U.S.C. § 727 (2006) (enumerating the circumstances warranting a denial
of a Chapter 7 discharge).
261. Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review v. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917,926-27 (Md. 1993).
262. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); see also
United States v. Andujar, No. 05-1801, 2006 WL 3741843, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2006) (holding that a
debtor in bankruptcy has a reduced expectation of privacy in his or her documents); Wade v. Smith, No.
IP 88-65-C, 1991 WL 504873, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 1991) ("[A] bankrupt cannot reasonably expect
to be free from intrusions by the trustee, who is entitled to possession of the bankrupt's property.");
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in In re Barman noted, this significantly reduced expectation of privacy "is a
natural consequence of the substantial and detailed disclosures that are inherent
in the bankruptcy process."263 Likewise, by agreeing to be bound by certain
conditions, it has repeatedly been held that probationers and parolees also have
a significantly diminished expectation of privacy in their homes.264
Fourth, insuring the efficiency and integrity of the national bankruptcy
law system is of interest to the Department of Justice, the Office of the United
States Trustee, the federal courts, and, most importantly, to the economic
interests of the entire country. 265 This notion is so axiomatic that in 1788 James
Madison articulated as follows in Federalist No. 42:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds
where the parties live, or their property may lie, or be removed into different
266
States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.
As F. Regis Noel has observed, Madison's statement on the centrality of
the bankruptcy laws to our national economy "shows that relief from debt was
considered important and desirable in that early and undeveloped stage of our
country's commerce."267 Tellingly, Madison's pronouncement in Federalist No.
42 and Noel's observation are no less significant today.268 Indeed, in the
Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1011, 1071 (2000) (noting that "debtors seeking relief under the Bankruptcy
Code acquiesce to some invasion of their privacy rights"); Taylor, supra note 144, at 609 ("Given the
disclosure requirements imposed upon individual debtors by the bankruptcy code, a debtor cannot
reasonably expect to retain the same level of privacy inside of bankruptcy as out.").
263. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
264. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001).
265. See United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
"efficiency and manageability of the bankruptcy system relies heavily on the free flow of accurate
information"); Wolinsky v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 269 B.R. 535, 542 (D. Vt. 2001) ("In addition to
the important public interest in upholding the integrity of the bankruptcy system and preventing tainted
compromise, there is a public interest in encouraging [the] just, speedy, inexpensive, and final resolution
of disputes."); Schechter v. Hansen (In re Hansen), 325 B.R. 746, 757 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) ("Indeed,
'the very integrity of the bankruptcy court and the successful administration of the bankruptcy system
rest upon compliance with the debtor's obligation of disclosure."' (citing Urological Grp., Ltd. v.
Petersen (In re Petersen), 296 B.R. 766, 790 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003))); Roudebush v. Sharp (In re
Sharp), 244 B.R. 889, 892 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (noting that a trustee's "ability to perform the
duties set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 704 depends on the accuracy and completeness of the debtor's
disclosures"); Garcia v. Coombs, 193 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The veracity of the
bankrupt's statements is essential to the successful administration of the Bankruptcy Act.") (citation
omited); see also Mark Bradshaw, The Role of Politics and Economics in Early American Bankruptcy
Law, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 739, 755 (1996) ("By creating a uniform bankruptcy law that preempted the
then existing numerous state laws, the federalists concentrated power in the national legislature and
created important national economic policy.") (emphasis added).
266. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
267. NOEL, supra note 3, at 6.
268. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In re Cont'l Air Lines, Inc.), 61 B.R. 758, 768 (S.D.
Tex. 1986) ("Bankruptcy proceedings have long held a special place in the federal system due to their
importance to the smooth functioning of the nation's commercial activities.").
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legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress noted the
269 Astrong national interest in the proper administration of bankruptcy cases. As
one court has noted:
Our nation's economy depends extensively on the availability of credit to
individuals. Hundreds of thousands of bankruptcy petitions are filed each year-
most of them by individuals seeking to extinguish or restructure overwhelming
debts. Not only do these debtors have a gravely important interest in obtaining a
fresh start so that they need not toil the remainder of their years attempting to
win an unwinnable battle with crushing debt . . . their creditors have a similarly
grave interest in a uniform system of asserting and protecting their rights and in
being treated fairly. The flow of consumer credit, the very lifeblood of the
national economy, would almost certainly be constricted by the absence of a
bankruptcy system comparable to that established by the Bankruptcy Code. Our
nation's economic welfare undeniably has come to depend upon ordinary
consumers making purchases on credit that are unsecured by collateral. For these
reasons, the federal government's interest in maintaining the bankruptcy system
is one of the highest order and must, therefore, be regarded as compelling.
In a similar manner, it is unquestionably accepted that a state's operation
of its probation system presents a special need beyond normal law enforcement,
due both to the need to ensure community safety while the probationer or
parolee is on release and to make certain that the restrictions placed on the
individual are observed. 27 1 The purpose of the supervisory release system is not
to uncover criminal conduct but to maintain compliance. Thus, the effective
operation of the supervisory release system itself takes precedence over the
privacy interests of any individual probationer or parolee.
As such, there certainly exists a strong governmental and national interest
in the proper functioning of the federal bankruptcy law system; a compelling
interest on equal ground with the need to ensure the proper operation of a
state's parole and probation system.
Despite this last observation, however, A. Mechele Dickerson argues that
the government does not have a compelling interest to prevent fraud in
consumer bankruptcy cases because "bankruptcy laws are designed to structure
the relative rights debtors and creditors have in a debtor's property" 272 and do
not implicate "the public health or safety issues." 2 73 Dickerson characterizes the
potential for discovering undisclosed assets that will in turn be used to pay
269. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 88 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6050.
270. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. v. Fitzgerald (In re Hodge), 220 B.R. 386,
392 (D. Idaho 1998). But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973) (holding that debtors
have no "fundamental" constitutional right to bankruptcy relief).
271. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
272. Dickerson, supra note 144, at 293 (citing In re Blue, 4 B.R. 580, 587 (Bankr. D. Md.
1980)).
273. Id. at 292.
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creditors as merely a private, commercial dispute between two parties.274 In
support of this conclusion, Dickerson analogizes the dynamic of the trustee in
the bankruptcy system to a private party engaged in litigation. To this end,
Dickerson argues that "if a private party suspects that an adversary is
withholding information or documents in private litigation, their recourse is to
seek sanctions-not to search their adversary's home." 275 In other words,
because a private party in a nonbankruptcy collection proceeding cannot obtain
authorization to search an adversary's residence upon suspicion of concealed
assets, Dickerson argues that this same limitation should be placed upon a
trustee in bankruptcy.276
Dickerson's analogy of a bankruptcy trustee to a private litigant
attempting to collect a debt in a simple, two-party commercial dispute is flawed
for several reasons. First, unlike private litigants who solely represent their own
interests, bankruptcy trustees represent the estate and the body of unsecured
creditors. 2 77 Stated slightly differently, unlike a private party, a bankruptcy
trustee is a fiduciary for the bankruptcy estate and must act for the collective
benefit of all creditors.278 Second, dissimilar to a private litigant, a bankruptcy
trustee is specifically charged with the statutory obligations to investigate the
financial affairs of the debtor, to secure possession of estate assets,279 and to
collect all nonexempt property of the estate to liquidate for the benefit of
274. Id. at 294 ("Notwithstanding the In re Barman court's attempt to draw comparisons
between the search in this case and those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in other civil contexts,
discovering assets that will be included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate and then used to pay a debt is a
private commercial dispute." (citing Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 415-16 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2000))).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 292-98. In particular, Dickerson argues as follows:
The federal government does not have a compelling interest in what is essentially a dispute
between private parties, i.e., the debtor and his creditors. Once a trustee is appointed, the
trustee has the right to title and possession of property of the estate, and debtors statutorily are
required to assist trustees. Notwithstanding this, existing law does not justify giving trustees
the right to search the home of a debtor to find property (or documents related to that property)
that the trustee may use to pay creditor claims any more than it would justify giving a private
plaintiff the right to search a home to get documents or objects that could be used to support
its claim or pay any judgment subsequently rendered in the case.
Id. at 298.
277. In re Parker, 186 B.R. 208, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
278. Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 n.8 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The Chapter 7
trustee is an officer of the court and owes a fiduciary duty both to the debtor and to the creditors as a
group."); see also In re NSCO, Inc., 427 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) ("Bankruptcy trustees
are fiduciaries and the obligations imposed on them in administering bankruptcy estates are fiduciary
obligations."); Wolf v. Kupetz (In re Wolf& Vine, Inc.), 118 B.R. 761, 771 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)
("A trustee owes each creditor of the estate a fiduciary duty.").
279. In re Rollins, 175 B.R. 69, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994); see also In re Chicago Art Glass,
Inc., 155 B.R. 180, 188 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that a "trustee is required to 'assume possession
or exercise control over all known assets of the estate' (quoting In re Melenyzer, 140 B.R. 143, 155
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992))).
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creditors.280 No such charge is bestowed upon an adverse party in a private,
two-party litigation. Third, unlike a private litigant searching for property to
levy against for satisfying a judgment, by virtue of § 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code, a bankruptcy trustee is a custodian of any property owned by the debtor
and succeeds to any interests in such property which the debtor possesses.281
Consequently, unlike a private party, a bankruptcy trustee exercises significant
control and dominion over a debtor's personal property. Fourth, and perhaps
most importantly, the U.S. Trustee's raison d'etre is to oversee and to protect
282the integrity of the bankruptcy system. More fundamentally, the U.S. Trustee
Program, which is effectuated by panel trustees in individual cases, is designed
to act as a collective guardian against fraud, dishonesty, and overreaching in the
bankruptcy arena.283 Thus, in analogizing a bankruptcy trustee to a private
litigant in a two-party commercial dispute, Dickerson simply fails,to account
for the national public interest in the efficient and proper operation of the
federal bankruptcy system. 284 It is precisely the strong national interest in
ensuring a debtor's compliance with the mandates of the Bankruptcy Code that
justifies a reasonable intrusion into an individual's privacy concerns,
particularly when a debtor voluntarily chooses to obtain the benefits of the
bankruptcy process. Such an overriding national interest does not exist in a
garden-variety two-party private commercial contract dispute.
Federal courts often rely on the individual's status as a probationer or
parolee as an aid to determining the ultimate reasonableness of a search when
balancing the government's interest in conducting a search against the privacy
interests of the individual.285 In other words, by taking the probationer's or
parolee's diminished expectations of privacy and voluntary acceptance of the
terms of released supervision, and by balancing this against the government's
legitimate interest in ensuring the successful operation of the parole and
probation systems, the federal courts routinely approve warrantless searches of
residences based upon no more than reasonable suspicion. It should likewise be
concluded that a bankruptcy trustee is authorized to conduct a warrantless
280. Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.), 14 F.3d 1380, 1386 (9th
Cir. 1994); see also In re Duque, 177 BR. 397, 403 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Discovery of, and
recovery of, the Debtor's assets are among the Trustee's principal duties as bankruptcy trustee.").
281. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Nw. Bank (In re Hutchinson), 132 B.R. 827, 832
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1991).
282. In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing In re Dow Coming
Corp., 195 B.R. 147,148 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996)).
283. Id.; see also Clippard v. Russell (In re Russell), 392 B.R. 315, 364 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
2008) ("The U.S. Trustee ha[s] the authority and the duty to investigate to determine whether the debtor
is abusing the bankruptcy system and whether grounds exist for opposing a discharge of her debts.");
McDow v. We the People Forms & Serv. Ctrs., Inc. (In re Douglas), 304 B.R. 223, 234 (Bankr. D. Md.
2003) ("The U.S. Trustee is clothed by law with the duty of policing the bankruptcy system to prevent
... abuse[ ]. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 536 (2000))).
284. See Taylor, supra note 144, at 623 ("The public has a strong interest in the negative
impact that a faulty bankruptcy system has on the economy.").
285. E.g., State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tenn. 2009).
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search, inventory, and appraisal of a debtor's home so long as the trustee
possesses reasonable suspicion that the debtor is concealing distributable assets
from the bankruptcy process.286 This is true because: (1) a consumer debtor has
a significantly reduced expectation of privacy; (2) filing for bankruptcy relief is
voluntary; and (3) the government has a compelling interest in ensuring the
integrity of the national bankruptcy system. Therefore, it should not be at all
discomforting for the federal courts to conclude that upholding the bankruptcy
law is a new special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment.
It must be noted, however, that there exists one distinguishing feature in
the analogy between parolees or probationers and consumer debtors. In the
parolee or probationer situation, there usually exists a state statute or regulation
that authorizes a search of the individual's home. If none exists, then it is
commonplace for the probationer or parolee to sign a probation order agreeing
to a search of the home, with or without a warrant. 287 At present, the federal
courts are split on the issue of whether a probationer or parolee can be subject
to a warrantless home search in the absence of a statute or regulation
authorizing such intrusion. 288 Nevertheless, parolees or probationers know in
advance that their residences can be subject to a warrantless intrusion. Indeed,
it would be disingenuous to suggest that this fact has not played a role in the
Court's decisions in this regard.289
Simply put, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that would alert a
debtor in advance of the possibility of a home search. 29 0 This fact does
286. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987) ("The discovery of evidence of
crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal
or the administrative scheme suspect."); see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir.
2000) ("FBIS did not lose its special need for 'the efficient and proper operation of the workplace,'
merely because the evidence obtained was evidence of a crime." (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 725 (1987))).
287. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (authorizing a warrantless search of
a residence with or without cause under the California Penal Code); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112 (2001) (consenting to a. residence search with or without a warrant); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987) (permitting a warrantless home search so long as "reasonable grounds" to believe a violation
occurred); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002) (allowing a warrantless search of a
home).
288. Compare United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (permitting a
warrantless search in the absence of any regulation or condition authorizing the search), and United
States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a warrantless search by probation and
police officers was reasonable despite the lack of probation condition or state regulation authorizing
such searches because "the needs of the probation system outweigh the privacy rights of the
probationers generally"), with United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 962-63 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a warrantless search by parole and police officers was unreasonable where neither parole agreement
nor state regulation authorized searches without warrants), and United States v. Kone, 591 F. Supp. 2d
593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the warrantless search of a probationer's home unreasonable in the
absence of a probation condition or statute authorizing the search).
289. See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 ("The probation order clearly expressed the search
condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The probation condition thus significantly
diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy.").
290. One way around this dilemma would be for Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to
authorize trustees to search debtors' homes.
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admittedly make the analogy less than perfect, but not ultimately unworkable.
More importantly, though, while a consumer debtor arguably does not forfeit
all expectations of privacy upon filing for bankruptcy, it also cannot be said
that a debtor is unaware of the scrutinizing aspect of the bankruptcy process
itself, given the extensive personal and financial information that must be
disclosed on the bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules. Irrespective
of the split of authority regarding whether some advance notice is needed prior
to conducting the search, the needs of protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy
system requiring full disclosure by consumer debtors outweigh the expectations
of privacy of the particular debtor who has voluntarily sought the benefits of
the bankruptcy process. 2 9 1
Ultimately, if called upon to do so in the future, it would be practical for
the federal courts to adopt a new special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement that would enable a search of a debtor's home
based upon reasonable suspicion because such an implementation would
promote the effectual operation of the bankruptcy laws.
B. The Bankruptcy Law System as a Closely Regulated Industry Under the
Fourth Amendment
In addition to the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, the
Supreme Court has also upheld warrantless administrative searches for closely
292 29 294regulated industries, such as liquor stores, pawnshops,29 firearms dealers,
underground mines,295  automobile junkyards,296  racing tracks,297 dental
298 299offices,298 and commercial trucking. As it currently stands, the warrantless
exception for regulated industries would not apply to a bankruptcy trustee's
contemplated search of a debtor's residence, primarily because the Bankruptcy
Code does not currently provide for an "administrative scheme" that would
substitute for a warrant. However, it would be entirely reasonable for the
federal courts to extend the ever-expanding list of "industries" falling under the
warrantless exception to the Fourth Amendment to include the bankruptcy law
291. In re Lufcin, 255 B.R. 204, 211 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that the interests of
the trustee and the public outweigh any privacy interests which the debtor may possess).
292. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
293. Winters v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 4 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1993).
294. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
295. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
296. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
297. Diercks v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., No. 02-C-988, 2006 WL 3761333, at *1 (E.D. Wis.
Dec. 20, 2006).
298. Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2000).
299. See United States v. Parker, 587 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Maldonado,
356 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2004).
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system, so long as the Bankruptcy Code is amended to provide for a
warrantless search of a debtor's residence. 30o
Perhaps in accordance with its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
general, the Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in its historical
application of the administrative search doctrine to closely regulated
industries.301 The Court in 1967 first expressed a preference for a governmental
authority to secure an administrative warrant prior to entering and inspecting
commercial premises. 3 02 Yet only three years later, the Court approved a
warrantless search of an establishment selling liquor based upon the long
history of close supervision of that industry.303 Then, two years later, the Court
approved a warrantless search of a gun dealer's locked storeroom during
operating hours primarily because the Federal Gun Control Act specifically
contemplated and provided for a warrantless inspection of business premises.3
The modern iteration of the administrative search doctrine for closely
regulated industries was expressed by the Court in Donovan v. Dewey305 and
New York v. Burger.306 In Donovan, the Court held that warrantless inspections
without prior notice to the operators of underground mines were reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
provided a "sufficiently comprehensive and predictable" statutory inspection
scheme. 307 More particularly, the Court concluded that a warrant is not
constitutionally required when Congress "has reasonably determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined [so] that
the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property
will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes."
30
300. The possibility of amending the Bankruptcy Code to authorize a trustee to search a
debtor's residence has previously been raised by Dickerson. See Dickerson, supra note 144, at 28.
301. For a detailed account of the historical development of the closely regulated industry
exception to the warrant requirement, see 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.2 (4th ed. 2004).
302. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) ("We find strong support in these
subpoena cases for our conclusion that.warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to
enter upon and inspect commercial premises.").
303. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
304. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) ("We have little difficulty in
concluding that where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibilities
of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without
a warrant where specifically authorized by statute.").
305. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
306. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
307. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600.
308. Id. But see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315-321 (1978) (holding that a
warrantless search of an electrical installation business pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1979 was unconstitutional because the Act failed to tailor the scope and frequency of the
inspections to any particular health and safety concern posed by the numerous businesses regulated by
the Act).
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Taking its lead from Donovan, the Court in Burger refined the parameters
of a warrantless search of a closely regulated industry. At issue in Burger was
the constitutionality of a warrantless search of an automobile junkyard,
conducted pursuant to a state statute authorizing such a search. 309After first
recognizing that owners or operators of a closely regulated industry have
reduced expectations of privacy in their premises, the Court concluded that a
warrantless search of a closely regulated industry would be considered
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if three factors were satisfied: (1)
there must be a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made; (2) the warrantless inspection
must be necessary to further that regulatory scheme; and (3) the administrative
scheme at issue must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.3o To fulfill the last requirement and serve as a warrant substitute, the
regulatory statute must advise the property owner that the search is being
conducted pursuant to law, the search itself must have a "properly defined
scope," and the statute must limit the discretion of the officials undertaking the
search.3 11 To limit the discretion of the searching officials, the statute must
312limit the time, place, and scope of any contemplated search. Finally, the
administrative scheme must apprise the property owner in advance of the
potential for a search of the premises. 3 13
In requiring a bankruptcy trustee to obtain a warrant prior to searching a
debtor's home, both the In re Barman and In re Bursztyn courts expressed a
hesitancy to sanction such conduct precisely because no section of the
Bankruptcy Code "states or implies an obligation upon a debtor to permit an
inspection by a trustee without a court order."314 Furthermore, both courts
observed that while the statutory requirements of disclosure and cooperation
placed upon debtors are onerous, these obligations have never been construed
to require a debtor to allow a home search absent a court order.315 These
legitimate concerns, however, can be mollified by amending the Bankruptcy
Code to provide for a warrantless search that would satisfy the standards of
Burger.
Filing for personal bankruptcy is not akin to operating a commercial
enterprise, but the underlying notions are essentially the same. The bankruptcy
process and a closely regulated commercial industry do share a common
characteristic, namely, the regularity and pervasiveness of governmental
oversight. Indeed, the moment a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, the
309. Burger, 482 U.S. at 693.
310. Id. at 702-03.
311. Id. at 703.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353, 371 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)
(quoting Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000)).
315. See id.; In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
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federal government, through the Department of Justice and the Office of the
U.S. Trustee, regulates and oversees every aspect of the consumer bankruptcy
process. Like the operation of a pawnshop, underground mine, automobile
junkyard, or dental office, the instant a voluntary bankruptcy petition is filed-
an act analogous to a business establishment applying for and obtaining an
operator's license-every aspect of the case is supervised by units of the
federal government. The pervasiveness of such governmental oversight can be
traced back at least three decades to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and
the creation of the U.S. Trustee Program.
In Burger, the requirement of a substantial governmental interest was
satisfied because the State of New York demonstrated a need to regulate the
vehicle-dismantling industry, "because motor vehicle theft ha[d] increased in
the State and because the problem of theft is associated with th[e] industry."316
Moreover, the Court observed that automobile theft "has become a significant
social problem, placing enormous economic and personal burdens upon the
citizens of different States."317 By analogy, if the commission of fraud by
consumer debtors is as frequent and common as it is believed to be, then it is
equally appropriate to conclude that the failure of consumer debtors to disclose
all of their distributable assets is a systemic national problem which places
serious economic strains on private creditors, administrative agencies, the
federal government, and local governments. If available figures are even
remotely accurate, this could amount to a collective loss of $1 billion a year.
This represents debtors who voluntarily file for bankruptcy protection to obtain
the benefit of the discharge, but who also choose to improperly conceal assets
from the reach of their creditors. Because of this loss of assets and the need for
debtors to be candid in their bankruptcy disclosures, the federal government has
a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy law system
from debtor fraud.
Moreover, a warrantless search of a debtor's residence is necessary to
further the bankruptcy law regime of full disclosure and honest dealings.
Despite the longstanding existence of both civil and criminal remedies to deter
and punish debtor fraud, it is suspected that such conduct is a serious national
problem.319 Returning to Burger, the Court in that case concluded that the
warrantless inspection of an automobile junkyard was necessary to further the
New York statutory scheme because "a warrant requirement would interfere
316. Burger, 482 U.S. at 708.
317. Id.
318. Walsh, supra note 22, at A9.
319. See, e.g., Mary Jo Heston et al., Bankruptcy Fraud: A Roundtable Discussion, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 275, 278 (1998) (noting the existence of bankruptcy fraud and its increased
sophistication over the past several decades); Mary Jo Heston, The United States Trustee: The Missing
Link of Bankruptcy Crime Prosecutions, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 359, 359 (1998) [hereinafter
Heston, The Missing Link] (noting that bankruptcy fraud "is a problem that affects all participants in the
bankruptcy process").
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with the statute's purpose of deterring automobile theft accomplished by
identifying vehicles and parts as stolen and shutting down the market in such
items." 320 This was so "[b]ecause stolen cars and parts often pass quickly
through an automobile junkyard." 3 21 Thus, the Court observed that frequent and
unannounced inspections were necessary to detect stolen parts. 322
Again, analogy can be made to the bankruptcy law process. As the facts in
In re Bursztyn demonstrate, it is notoriously easy for consumer debtors to hide
assets from disclosure, most notably valuable items of personal property such
as cash, jewelry, collectibles, artwork, stock certificates, and antiques.
Moreover, like the automobile parts in Burger, an individual's personal
property can be "passed quickly" and moved from location to location if one is
determined to defraud creditors. Because of the mobility of most consumer
debtor's assets, any advance warning of a forthcoming or requested inspection
by the bankruptcy trustee could result in the "disappearance" of the assets and a
resultant loss to creditors. For this reason, the In re Barman court's prescription
that any motion by a bankruptcy trustee to search a debtor's home be filed upon
notice to the debtor might prove to be an exercise in futility. Similar to Burger,
an unannounced search would be crucial if the bankruptcy system is truly
aimed at remedying the suspected widespread problem of debtor fraud.
Continuing the analogy, in order to satisfy the dictates of Burger, the
bankruptcy law scheme must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant. As mentioned above, no provision in the Bankruptcy Code currently
exists that advises that a debtor's residence could be subject to a search by a
bankruptcy trustee. However, if the concealment of assets is in fact a systemic
problem, then Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to add that one of
the debtor's duties is to permit a home inspection should the trustee have some
suspicion that the debtor is harboring assets, or alternatively promulgate a
provision in the Code that would alert a debtor in advance that a home search
might be part of the financial affairs investigation.323
320. Burger, 482 U.S. at 710.
321. Id.
322. Id.; see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981) (noting that requiring a
warrant prior to searching a federally regulated underground mine would undercut statutory objectives
"[iun light 'of the notorious ease with which many safety or health hazards may be concealed if advance
warning of inspection is obtained"') (citing S. REP. No. 95-181, at 27 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3427. But see Diercks v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., No. 02-C-988, 2006 WL 3761333,
at *7-8 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2006) (holding that the use of uninterrupted video surveillance of the
defendants for two months did not meet the standard for random and unannounced inspections as
articulated in Burger).
323. In addition to amending the Bankruptcy Code in these ways, Dickerson has suggested
that Congress could also "revise the dischargeability provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to make the
debtor's consent to a residential search a condition of discharge, thereby placing debtors on notice of the
possibility that their homes may be searched." Dickerson, supra note 144, at 303. Such an approach,
however, may run afoul of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. As expressed by Jane Rutherford,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "holds that the government cannot make an individual choose
between getting a state conferred benefit and giving up a constitutional right." Jane Rutherford, The
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Amending the Code in this way would apprise a debtor in advance that a
residence search could possibly occur, and would alert a debtor that the search
was being conducted pursuant to statute and not at the bald discretion of the
bankruptcy trustee. Further, any revision to the Bankruptcy Code should also
satisfy the requirement of a "properly defined scope" and limit the discretion of
the bankruptcy trustee by only authorizing a search during normal business
hours, in the debtor's presence, and without forcible entry. Unlike a statute of
the kind examined in Burger, any revision of the Bankruptcy Code should not
provide that a trustee search could be made on a frequent or regular basis:
preserving the diminished expectations of privacy in the home remains a
countervailing governmental interest, and permitting repeated searches of a
particular debtor's home would be unduly abusive.
Finally, any amendment to the Bankruptcy Code providing for a statutory
search of a debtor's home would necessarily need to account for a related issue
that has been the subject of dispute in the federal courts, namely, whether a
bankruptcy court has the authority to issue a search warrant or inspection order
involving a debtor's residence. 32 4 Simply stated, Congress would also need to
include a provision in the Bankruptcy Code explicitly authorizing a bankruptcy
court to issue an administrative search warrant.
It would be practical for the federal courts alternatively to carve out an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement-like the special
needs exception-based upon the view that the bankruptcy law system is the
equivalent of a closely regulated industry.
C. Implied Consent to a Search of the Home
A third theory by which a bankruptcy trustee could conduct a warrantless
search of a debtor's home is implied consent. Pursuant to the consent exception
to the search warrant requirement, state actors may search private premises
without a warrant "provided the individual whose property is searched freely
and voluntarily consents to the search." 325 For a Fourth Amendment inquiry,
the requisite consent can be implied by actions or conduct. 326 It can be granted
Meek Shall Inherit the Earth: A Power-Based Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions on Religion, 72
DENV. U. L. REv. 909,909 (1995).
324. See, e.g., In re Application of Tr. in Bankr. for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341, 342
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee is not authorized to obtain a warrant under Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-A-Way), 300 B.R.
31, 38 (E.D. Cal. 2003) ("Clearly the explicit requirements of Rule 41 reflect the exacting mandate of
the Fourth Amendment and cannot be circumvented by the statutory structure created by the Bankruptcy
Code."). But see Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000)
(authorizing the issuance of an inspection order to a bankruptcy trustee).
325. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 269 (2005).
326. Palmieri v. Kammerer, 690 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 (D. Conn. 2010) (citing United States v.
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Taylor, 722 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944
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explicitly or tacitly.327 Whether an individual provides consent in a given
instance is a factual question;328 the standard for measuring the scope of the
consent is one of objective reasonableness under the totality of the
circumstances. 329
Due to the numerous obligations placed upon debtors when taking
advantage of the bankruptcy process, and the countervailing duties imposed
upon trustees to investigate debtors' financial affairs, it is valid and reasonable
to conclude that under the totality of circumstances, debtors impliedly consent
to searches of their residences when they voluntarily file for bankruptcy relief.
As one commentator has argued: "By voluntarily submitting himself and his
assets to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, a debtor has a decreased
expectation of privacy and the Fourth Amendment should not be an obstacle to
the trustee's ability to perform his duties."330
The bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules, 331 documents that
every debtor must complete and file with the bankruptcy court under penalty of
perjury,332 serve as a foreshadowing of the intrusiveness of the bankruptcy
process to every debtor. In exchange for an immediate automatic stay against
most attempts by creditors to collect pre-petition debts,333 and the future
possibility of obtaining a discharge of the debt, the required schedules cause the
debtor to disclose all property and detailed personal information. As previously
stated, the trustee is currently largely at the mercy of the debtor with regard to
the disclosure of assets that are available for distribution to creditors.334
Because the bankruptcy system relies heavily on self-reporting, it provides "the
opportunity for, and the lure of, fraud." 335
Schedule A calls for the debtor to list and describe all real property held
by the debtor, together with its current value and the amount of any secured
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that consent for Fourth Amendment purposes "can be in the form of words,
gestures, or conduct").
327. Samuel C. Rickless, The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15
GEo. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 261, 267 (2004).
328. United States v. Kelley, 594 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2010).
329. Palmieri, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
330. Brandy L. Kuretich, Comment, Bankruptcy and the Fourth Amendment: Should the Test
be "Reasonable" or "Administrative?," 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 31, 32 (2003). But see Taylor,
supra note 144, at 628 (arguing that "surrendering the right to privacy is not a condition clearly incident
to filing an individual bankruptcy petition as may be the case for a corporate debtor").
331. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2006).
332. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008.
333. See II U.S.C. § 362 (enumerating the types of creditor action that are stayed once a
bankruptcy petition is filed).
334. In re Beitzel, 333 B.R. 84, 92 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005) ("The importance of having a
debtor submit complete and accurate bankruptcy schedules is paramount; the bankruptcy system relies
heavily on self-reporting by debtors."); see also Heston, The Missing Link, supra note 319, at 364
("Bankruptcy is predominantly a civil matter that relies heavily on self-reporting and voluntary
disclosure.").
335. Heston, The Missing Link, supra note 319, at 360.
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claims against the property.336 Schedule B requires the debtor to list, describe,
and value all personal property, including, but not limited to, the following:
cash on hand; deposit accounts; household goods and furnishings; wearing
apparel; annuities; life insurance policies; interests in IRAs; stocks and bonds;
alimony, maintenance, and support payments, if any; all types of vehicles; and
any collectibles and hobby equipment.337 Schedules D through F necessitate the
debtor to list the identity of all known creditors and the amounts owed to
each.338 Schedule I requires a debtor to divulge a detailed account of income,
including the reasons for any anticipated increase or decrease, and the identity
of the debtor's employer.33 9 In addition, Schedule J requires a debtor to itemize
and to calculate current monthly expenditures, including for such items as food,
utilities, rent, medical expenses, and entertainment expenses. 34 Schedule J also
causes a debtor to identify and to calculate monthly net income. Finally, the
"Statement of Financial Affairs" requires a debtor to divulge another set of
personal information, including, but not limited to, any sources of additional
income, any pending lawsuits or administrative proceedings involving the
debtor, any repossessions or foreclosures occurring in the period preceding the
bankruptcy filing, and the existence, location, and contents of any safe deposit
boxes held by the debtor. 34 1 These documents, and all pleadings filed in a
bankruptcy case, are available for unlimited inspection by the general public. 342
Importantly, these documents contain information that enables a reviewer
to construct a very concrete picture regarding the debtor's life conditions
(assuming that the documents are accurate). That is, the documents describe
what the debtor does for a living, where the debtor is employed, and how long
the debtor has worked there. They also reveal the nature of the debtor's
relationships with people by showing with whom the debtor lives.343
Furthermore, it illustrates the debtor's character and personality "by showing
life circumstances such as what he reads, medical problems, where he spends
his income, detailed cash flows, information on schooling, any businesses
336. See Official Bankruptcy Form 6A, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rulesfBKFormsl207/B_006A1207f.pdf.
337. See Official Bankruptcy Form 6B, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BKFormslI207/B_006B1 207 fpdf.
338. See Official Bankruptcy Forms 6D, 6E & 6F, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx.
339. See Official Bankruptcy Form 61, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BKForms_1 207/B_0061i207fpdf.
340. See Official Bankruptcy Form 6J, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourtsRulesAndPolicies/rules/BKForms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf.
341. See Official Bankruptcy Form 7, available at,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BKFormsOfficial_2010/B 007_0410.pdf.
342. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 262, at 1068-69 ("The general public is afforded nearly
unlimited access to records and proceedings in the main bankruptcy case.").
343. Id. at 1063.
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entered into, lawsuits pending, and if and where he attends" any religious
congregation. 34
The foregoing is only the beginning of the process on the path toward
discharge. Pursuant to § 521(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is required
to "cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the
trustee's duties" as laid out by § 704(a) of the Code.345 Quite significantly,
§ 704(a) prescribes the duties of a bankruptcy trustee, in part, as including an
affirmative obligation to collect and to liquidate property of the estate for the
benefit of creditors and to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor. 34 6
Furthermore, § 521(a)(4) of the Code commands that a debtor surrender to the
trustee all property of the estate, 34 7 and pursuant to § 343 of the Code, within a
reasonable time after commencing the bankruptcy case a debtor must submit to
a financial examination by creditors in what is known as the § 341 "meeting of
creditors." 348 Because the § 341 meeting of creditors lasts for only a short
period of time, a debtor can also be questioned about financial affairs and the
whereabouts of the estate through a separate deposition-like process known as a
Rule 2004 examination. 34 9 Unlike a traditional deposition, however, a Rule
2004 examination is often described as a "fishing expedition," 350 and its
avowed purpose "is to allow a trustee, or others interested in accomplishing the
same ends, to discover and investigate how to bring to light possession of assets
of the debtor which might be intentionally concealed or overlooked in
ignorance or haste."351 "In addition to the[se] bankruptcy specific discovery
methods, parties may utilize the federal civil discovery rules during" certain
proceedings by or against a debtor.352
The applicable Bankruptcy Code sections and procedural rules are
designed so that the participants in the process can make intelligent, informed
decisions based on fact rather than fiction. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
"requires the fullest disclosure, the utmost good faith," and the surrender of all
nonexempt assets of the debtor. 353 But despite all of these investigatory
techniques and voluntary disclosure requirements placed upon debtors, it is
suggested that some individual debtors attempt to "play fast and loose with
their assets or with the reality of their affairs." 354 As one commentator has
noted, when a debtor fails to live up to the affirmative obligations of disclosure
344. Id.
345. See II U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) (2006).
346. See id § 704(a)(1), (4).
347. See id. § 521(a)(4).
348. See id. § 343; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003 (calling for a meeting of creditors to
examine the debtor).
349. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004.
350. See, e.g., In re Valley Forge Plaza Assocs., 109 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
351. Id.
352. Heston, The Missing Link, supra note 319, at 369.
353. In re Breitling, 133 F. 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1904).
354. Boroffv. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987).
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and candor, the debtor "undermines the implicit compromise that he strikes
with creditors through the bankruptcy process: fair and efficient distribution of
all assets in return for a discharge of his debts."355
The In re Barman and In re Bursztyn courts correctly observed that
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code explicitly imposes an obligation upon a debtor
356to permit a home inspection by a trustee without a court order, but the
decisions incorrectly presume that nothing implies such ability to do so. That is,
a fair reading of the debtor's duties of cooperation357 and surrender, together
with the trustee's countervailing responsibilities to collect and to liquidate
estate property and to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor, leads to the
reasonable conclusion that upon the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition, a
debtor impliedly consents to a home search for purposes of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Indeed, without this ability of the trustee to verify the debtor's
disclosures and representations during the bankruptcy proceeding, "there is
nothing to deter potential debtors from abusing the system by failing to disclose
valuable assets."358 The credibility and integrity of the entire bankruptcy
system "is dependent on the ability of the trustee to verify the information in
the schedules and uncover hidden assets."359
While this result may appear unduly intrusive, two factors should help
assuage any objections to this prescription. First, due to the sheer volume of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed annually, along with a private
trustee's limited resources, a trustee would not likely exercise this power and
act on this implied consent unless the trustee had serious cause to believe a
debtor was improperly shielding assets. Second, while the debtor's implied
consent makes the obtaining of a warrant unnecessary, the search itself still
must not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If a debtor challenged
the reasonableness of a search after its occurrence, and a court concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee violated the Reasonableness Clause, it is presumed that the
trustee could be held liable for such a violation.
Consequently, the debtor's act of voluntarily filing for bankruptcy relief,
and the totality of circumstances underlying the nature of the bankruptcy
process itself, leads to the justifiable conclusion that a consumer debtor
implicitly consents to a home search for uncovering assets of the estate.
355. Nevin M. Gewertz, Comment, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the
Bankruptcy Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 152, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 909, 911-12 (2009).
356. Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353, 371 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); Taunt
v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
357. As a noted treatise on bankruptcy law observes, "[c]ooperate is a broad term, . .. and
must be construed that whenever the trustee calls upon the debtor for assistance in the performance of
his duties, the debtor is required to respond, at least if the request is not unreasonable." 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTCY ' 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2009).
358. Kuretich, supra note 330, at 49.
359. Id.
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Conclusion
The bankruptcy process was designed to help only the "honest but
unfortunate" class of debtors. 36 0 And while the majority of debtors who file for
bankruptcy protection appear to fit this description, a number of debtors
attempt to reap the benefits of the bankruptcy process by failing to disclose or
to turn over all of their distributable assets to the bankruptcy trustee, and, in
turn, the court.
Bankruptcy fraud is a recurring, ongoing problem that affects not only the
participants in the bankruptcy process but also society in general and the
national economy. 3 And despite all of the available techniques to uncover
unreported assets of the estate, it is estimated that tens of thousands of instances
of bankruptcy fraud are committed each year. 362 To protect the integrity of the
bankruptcy process, and to prevent and deter future fraudulent debtors,
bankruptcy trustees must be afforded additional abilities to investigate and to
expose suspected efforts of fraud.
To date, the Supreme Court has not permitted a warrantless administrative
search of an individual's residence unless commercial activity was conducted
in the home or "the search was directed at convicted felons still serving
sentences of probation or parole."363 But as consumer bankruptcy filings
continue to increase and the Department of Justice, through the Office of the
U.S. Trustee, increases its efforts to uncover debtor fraud, the Supreme Court
may in the future be called upon to decide whether a search of a debtor's home,
with or without a warrant, is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
The current civil and criminal remedies for the concealment of assets have
not stopped debtors from committing fraud upon their creditors. Therefore, as
an additional remedy to inhibit and to deter such abuse, a trustee should be
authorized to conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's home under one of the
three alternative theories articulated in this Article. To that end, the bankruptcy
trustee should be permitted only to conduct a search and to appraise any
property found on the premises; a trustee should not be authorized to seize any
property-primarily due to its potential exemption from the bankruptcy
process-and no forcible entry should be allowed. Furthermore, because of the
ease and speed with which debtors can move, hide, or transfer personal
property, the search must be conducted without prior notice to the debtor.
While arbitrariness and unconstrained discretion is the chief evil that the Fourth
Amendment aims to prevent, the practical realities of bankruptcy would not
lend themselves to such misuse. Due to the annual volume of filed consumer
360. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
361. Heston, The Missing Link, supra note 319, at 359 ("Bankruptcy fraud is a problem that
affects all participants in the bankruptcy process.").
362. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
363. Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2002).
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bankruptcy cases, trustees would most assuredly not exercise this power unless
they had serious cause to believe a debtor was improperly shielding assets.
Bankruptcy law presents its own unique context, different from all other
civil settings. The Bankruptcy Code attempts to harmonize the interests of
debtors and creditors. However, the bankruptcy process is incredibly powerful,
enabling individuals to shed burdensome debt to the detriment of their
creditors. In order to realize this benefit, debtors must fully submit themselves
and their assets to the court. As a condition of voluntarily choosing bankruptcy
relief, debtors should expect intrusions into their privacy. And when there is
evidence that a debtor is not being completely forthcoming and candid, the
debtor should not be permitted to use the Fourth Amendment as a shield to
further these destructive efforts.
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